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I. INTRODUCTION
“He is not dead who departs from life with a high and noble
fame; but he is dead, even while living, whose brow is branded
with infamy.”—Ludwig Tieck

A line easily crossed is that between fame, meaning
“widespread reputation . . . renown . . . [or] public eminence,”
and infamy, meaning “evil reputation, public reproach, or strong
condemnation as the result of a shameful, criminal, or outrageous
act.”1 Both fame and infamy arise from public perception, but, as
Tieck suggested, a wide chasm exists between the consequences of
fame and those of infamy. Congress must agree with Tieck’s
sentiment because it has recently accorded famous marks a greater
than average “life” that extends beyond the specific goods or
services associated with the mark.2 On the other hand, scandalous
and immoral (or infamous) marks, while purportedly entitled to
common law protection, are essentially “dead” in the federal
trademark registration scheme because they are barred from
receiving a federal trademark registration and all the protections
and benefits encompassed therein.3 The connection between
these two types of marks has never been explored. However,
drawing parallels between famous marks and marks that may be
scandalous or immoral suggests a new, two-tiered approach in
identifying scandalous and immoral marks that will more
appropriately frame the registration prohibition’s scope and
create greater consistency in its application.4
1 WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
513, 728 (revised ed. 1994) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S].
2 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) and other scattered sections (2006)).
For purposes of this article, I will be using “trademark” and “mark” interchangeably
as encompassing trademarks, service marks, collective marks, or certification marks. Cf.
WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS AND ANALOGOUS
SUBJECTS (FIRM-NAMES, BUSINESS-SIGNS, GOOD-WILL, LABELS, & C.) 63-68 (Boston, Little,
Brown, and Co. 1873) [hereinafter BROWNE I].
3 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006).
4 For purposes of this article, the prohibition on registering marks that consist of or
comprise scandalous or immoral matter will be referred to as the “scandalous registration
prohibition.” Additionally, I will refer to “scandalous marks” rather than marks that
“consist[] of or comprise[] immoral . . . or scandalous matter.” Id.
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Given the relatively few decisions interpreting scandalous
marks, creating a more appropriate standard appears to focus on a
minor conflict in trademark law. However, the problem is far
greater than these few decisions indicate. At least one scholar
estimates that the scandalous registration prohibition is used to
reject hundreds of trademark applications each year, but because
registrants appeal few of these rejections, only a few decisions are
reported.5 In recent years, many of these rejected applications
likely are intent-to-use applications, meaning that the applicants
have not spent time, money, or other significant resources in
creating customer association and good-will between their
products and the rejected marks. However, other applicants file
their applications after using their marks in interstate commerce.
For these applicants, rejection of their federal registration
applications means that either they will have to abandon marks in
which they have invested significant resources and customer
goodwill, or they will continue to use their marks without receiving
the protection of federal registration. Either option harms these
owners. Creating a more consistent standard allows future
applicants to predict with more accuracy whether they will be able
to obtain federal registration for their marks and, presuming that
this is the function of the prohibition, will guide them to use more
6
“appropriate” marks.
One justification for precluding registration of scandalous
marks may be that such marks cannot fulfill the purpose of a
mark, which is to identify that a product is generated from a single
source and thereby distinguish the product from those generated
by other sources.7 Ask the residents of Scottsdale, Arizona, if
vulgar terms can serve as a source-identifier, and they may not
know what you are asking. If you ask them about the new Pink
Taco restaurant, they are likely to express outrage at Harry
Morton’s expansion of the Las Vegas restaurant into Scottsdale.8
Although the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) apparently is
unaware of its meaning, the term “pink taco” is a vulgar slang term

5 Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of
Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 676 (1993).
6
Whether it is constitutional to guide trademark applicants towards “appropriate”
speech is beyond the scope of this article. However, some have discussed whether such a
channeling function violates First Amendment protections on freedom of speech. See,
e.g., Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports Team Names: Has
Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4 SPORTS LAW. J. 65, 71-74 (1997).
7 FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS, WITH A DIGEST AND
REVIEW OF THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN AUTHORITIES 51-52 (Albany, Weare C. Little
1860).
8 See Lesley Wright, Council Becomes Equal Opportunity Offender, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 1,
2006, at 2.
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for female genitalia.9 Despite its “scandalous” nature, “pink taco”
has obviously served as an excellent source identifier.
So if these scandalous and immoral marks can serve their
semiotic function, one must consider why Congress has prohibited
federal registration of such marks since 1905. One theory is that
Congress implemented the prohibition under the influence of the
restrictive moral precepts of 1905, indicating that the registration
prohibition should hold little value in contemporary society.
Alternatively, even if the purpose of including a scandalous
registration prohibition is to regulate morality, one may question
the value of such a prohibition. If the mark was truly offensive,
then one may speculate that the general public would refuse to
purchase the associated goods or services, which would eventually
eliminate the mark from the marketplace. Regardless of one’s
normative assessment of the prohibition, Congress has retained
the scandalous registration prohibition for more than a century,
even while amending other portions of the trademark registration
system. Because the restriction is not likely to change, a host of
secondary questions are raised regarding what should constitute a
scandalous mark.
Under the current trademark registration act, a trademark
cannot be registered if it “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter.”10 Because this prohibition
affects a person’s statutory right to a trademark registration, it
must comport with Fifth Amendment due process rights by being
“sufficiently precise to enable the PTO and the courts to apply the
law fairly and to notify a would-be registrant that the mark he
adopts will not be granted a federal registration.”11 However,
Congress has never expressly provided a definition or standard for
determining “immoral” or “scandalous” matter, leading courts to
rely upon dictionary definitions to define and apply the
9 Id. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued three registrations to Morton
for PINK TACO in 2000 and 2001 for: restaurant services, U.S. Trademark No. 2,418,093
(filed Sept. 24, 1998); beverage glassware, U.S. Trademark No. 2,376,167 (filed Mar. 22,
1999); and clothing, U.S. Trademark No. 2,400,891 (filed Feb. 18, 1999). When similar
vulgar terms have been submitted for registration, the PTO has at least questioned
whether they should be registered. Compare In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443
(T.T.A.B. 1971) (finding BUBBY TRAP for brassieres scandalous) with In re Hershey, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (finding BIG PECKER BRAND for clothing not
to be scandalous). With respect to PINK TACO, it appears that the PTO did not raise the
question.
10 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). The relevant statutory language allows registration
unless a mark “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or
matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” Id.
This article will focus on the scandalous and immoral prohibition and will not address
deceptiveness or disparagement.
11 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
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parameters of “scandalousness.”12 Unfortunately, such definitions
merely cast the same ill-defined concept into new words rather
than clarify how the prohibition should be applied.13 To date, the
search for a unified and consistent standard has proven less than
successful, making it questionable whether the scandalous
registration prohibition is sufficiently precise to give a trademark
owner notice that his or her adopted mark will be barred from
federal registration as scandalous or immoral.
Courts recognize that application of the scandalous
registration prohibition is confusing and inconsistent. Part of the
reason for this inconsistency is that societal standards change over
time. Thus, “what was considered scandalous as a trademark or
service mark twenty, thirty or fifty years ago may no longer be
considered so, given the changes in societal attitudes. Marks once
thought scandalous may now be thought merely humorous (or
even quaint).”14 While it is true that societal standards change, it is
not true that there is no possibility of having consistency in the
standard and its application, merely that, over decades, there may
not be consistency in the outcome.
In comparison to the century-long prohibition on scandalous
marks, Congress did not recognize famous marks until 1996. For
purposes of receiving extra trademark protection akin to an
absolute property right, a mark is considered famous when the
public associates the mark with a single source (and single image)
without reference to the associated goods and services.15 Congress
originally identified at least eight factors to determine if the mark
has sufficient fame, which recently was reduced to four factors.16
Regardless of the number, the factors detail different facets of
three essential considerations: (1) whether the mark is the kind
that can have a singular meaning for the general public regardless
of the associated goods or services; (2) the public’s recognition of
the mark’s singular meaning; and (3) the scale of the public’s
understanding, or the level of fame, that the term has.
The recent elevation and clarification of famous marks raises
the question of whether famous trademarks’ ugly stepsister,
scandalous marks, could be determined by using factors that
12 See, e.g., id. at 485 n.10; see also In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328
(C.C.P.A. 1938).
13 “Despite the lack of legislative guidance, the courts and the Board have been fairly
consistent in articulating a definition for the term. Any disparities arise in the application
of the definition.” ANNE GILSON LALONDE, 1 TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE
§ 3.04[6][a][i][A] (2006).
14 In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1219 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
15 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
16 Id. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (2000), amended by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
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reflect the same or similar considerations. These considerations
are informative if one considers certain scandalous and immoral
marks as crossing the line between fame and infamy, namely,
marks that are scandalous or immoral regardless of the associated
goods or services.
Although no one has expressly explored this connection
between famous and scandalous marks, others have hinted at it.
Before Congress enacted the prohibition on the registration of
scandalous trademarks, the Patent Office (now known as the
PTO) considered an application for a mark consisting of a
Masonic emblem for use on flour.17 Initially, the PTO rejected the
application because the Masonic emblem had world-wide
recognition as being associated with the quasi-religious fraternity
and, thus, could not serve as a source-identifier for the flour
merchant.18 The Masonic emblem would merely indicate to the
public that the flour merchant was a Freemason. This decision
may be an early example of the Patent Office rejecting an
application because of fame—the “mark” had such a strong
association with an existing entity that it was unavailable as a mark
for another entity in a different field.19
On appeal, the Commissioner of Patents recognized the fame
of the Masonic emblem as an important factor by questioning
whether the Masonic “emblems are not to be regarded as its
property, at least in such a sense, that no person can monopolize
them as trade-mark devices.”20 The Commissioner of Patents did
not answer his own question regarding property rights. Rather, he
rested his decision upon a ground similar to that of the PTO
Examiner. The public would not only believe that the flour
merchant was connected to the Mason fraternity, but such a
connection would be a deception.21 In discussing the public’s
reaction to the Masonic mark in trade, the Commissioner noted
the following:
Among masons with whom this token has a moral significance,
its use in that capacity would undoubtedly be regarded as a base
prostitution of it to mercenary purposes, while with others its

17 BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 238-42. Masonry is both a body of knowledge and a
system of ethics based upon the idea that people must improve themselves while
supporting “family, faith, country, and [the] fraternity.” Masons of California, Mission,
http://www.freemason.org/about_mission.php (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
18 BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 238-39.
19 During this time period, trademark protection did not extend to service marks and,
thus, would not have extended to the Masonic emblem. A prominent legal scholar of the
time also scoffed at the idea that a religious entity could become a trading company and
acquire trademarks. Id. at 37-38.
20 Id. at 241 (reprinting the appellate decision).
21 Id. at 241-42.
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mystic force would often dissipate its virtues as a trade-mark,
and perhaps in some instances place the article it appeared
upon under a ban.22

In other words, using this famous “mark” for commerce
would raise “strong condemnation”—or be scandalous—either
because the merchant was commercializing an important moral
philosophy or because the merchant was associated with a morally
corrupt and depraved group, depending upon the individual’s
perception of Freemasonry.23
As recognized by the PTO’s decision, there is a strong
connection between fame and scandal (or infamy), and this
connection suggests a clearer standard for the scandalous
registration prohibition. Part II of this article discusses the
evolution of the registration prohibition on scandalous marks. In
particular, it will highlight previously unrecognized aspects of the
common law and international law regimes which formed the
legal landscape prior to, and significantly influenced,
congressional enactment of the scandalous registration
prohibition in 1905. Part III discusses the evolution of the
scandalous registration prohibition through case law and suggests
a classification system for the marks previously considered under
the scandalous prohibition. Part IV discusses the proposed twotiered test for evaluating whether a mark is scandalous or immoral.
The first tier concerns per se scandalous marks, which are
analogized to famous marks in that there is a singular image or
meaning associated with the mark regardless of the associated
goods or services. Moreover, these marks may be classified as
famous—or infamous—based upon “niche” geographic regions
within the United States. In the second tier are the contextually
scandalous marks, namely, those that require examination of the
mark as a whole, the associated goods and services, and other
marketplace considerations before determining whether the mark
is scandalous. The proposed test would apply a presumption of
scandalousness and then identify specific factors that an applicant
can use to overcome this presumption. Assuming that Congress
retains the scandalous mark prohibition, as it has for more than a
century, the proposed two-tier test would result in a more
predictable application of the scandalous registration prohibition.

22
23

Id. at 242.
WEBSTER’S, supra note 1, at 1274 (defining “scandalous”).
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE REGISTRATION PROHIBITION ON
SCANDALOUS MARKS
When Congress enacted the scandalous registration
prohibition, it did not do so in a vacuum. Years of preexisting
common law defined the purpose for protecting trademarks and
the type of property right a trademark should receive. The federal
registration system reflected the rights accorded marks under the
common law. The initial versions of the statute, however, lacked
an express scandalous registration prohibition.
Congress
eventually added the registration prohibition in 1905 with little
explanation. However, the extant common law and international
law indicate that practitioners and courts did contemplate whether
a scandalous mark should be accorded protection. A more careful
examination of these historical roots forms the foundation for the
proposed two-tier standard.
A. The Federal Trademark Registration System
1. The Purpose and Scope of Common Law Trademark Rights
Before Congress enacted a federal registration system, the
common law protected existing trademarks from acquisition or
misappropriation by entities competing with the trademark owner.
In fact, the main purpose in creating trademark protection was to
protect the general public from unscrupulous entities engaged in
unfair competition.24 Thus, any protection should extend “‘only
insofar as is necessary to prevent customer confusion as to who
produced the goods and to facilitate differentiation of the
trademark owner’s goods.’”25
To effectuate this purpose, a mark has been accorded a
limited property right.26 The property right only extends to a
mark when used with the good or service for which the
manufacturer appropriated the mark.27 The effect of having a
limited property right is aptly summarized by Professor Clarisa
24 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 24:70 (4th ed. 2006) (“Traditional trademark law rests primarily on a policy of
protection of customers from mistake and deception . . . .”).
25 1 Id. § 2.14 (quoting Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980)).
26 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879).
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or
property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by
all other persons . . . is a property right for the violation of which damages may
be recovered in an action at law, and the continued violation of it will be
enjoined by a court of equity, with compensation for past infringement.
Id. See also BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 338-39 (stating that the property right is created by
customer perception).
27 See Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 326 (1872); BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 43-44.
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Long as follows: “[W]ith this focus on consumers, the classical
trademark entitlement is essentially a set of use rights rather than
purely exclusionary rights: A trademark holder’s ability to recover is
determined by the way the mark is used by others. What
constitutes a prohibited third-party use is a context-dependent
question.”28
As a necessary corollary, nineteenth century courts and legal
commentators generally rejected any express claim that a
trademark owner could acquire an absolute property right in a
trademark.29 For example, the New Jersey Court of Chancery
stated in 1888 that
It would seem to be settled beyond question, that there can be
no such thing as a trade-mark distinct from and unconnected
with a vendible commodity . . . . It can have no existence as
property or a thing distinct from and wholly unconnected with
an article of traffic.30

As the law progressed, it would become clear that this statement
was incorrect on two counts: courts recognized and protected
service marks associated with services rather than just vendible
goods, and more importantly, some marks were elevated to the
point where they were accorded property rights in absentia of
association with a commodity.31
Thus, under the traditional conception of trademark
protection, the Nike swoosh would receive protection from any
entity using the mark on the same or similar goods to those sold
by Nike under the swoosh mark, such as athletic equipment.
However, if another entity were to use the Nike swoosh on a
wholly disparate type of good or service, such as photocopying,
Nike would not be able to prevent such use. It is with this limited
approach to trademark rights that Congress undertook the task of
creating a federal registration system.
2. Creation of a Federal Registration System
As early as 1860, the House of Representatives considered
Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2006) (emphasis added).
Canal, 80 U.S. at 326 (citing McAndrews v. Bassett, 10 Jur. N.S. 550) (“‘Property in
the word for all purposes cannot exist . . . .’”); UPTON, supra note 7, at 25-26; WILLIAM
HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS AND ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS
(FIRM-NAMES, BUSINESS-SIGNS, GOOD-WILL, LABELS, & C.) 71 (Boston, Little, Brown, and
Co. 2d ed. 1885) [hereinafter BROWNE II] (citing Ainsworth v. Walmesley, L.R. 1 Eq. 518
(1866)) (noting that no man has property in a mark per se but only rights in the mark in
association with his trade).
30 Schneider v. Williams, 14 A. 812, 814 (N.J. Ch. 1888) (citing numerous English and
American cases with approval). As previously noted, however, the PTO did question
whether some entities should receive an absolute property right in their mark when the
mark has reached a certain level of fame. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
31 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 4:14; see also infra Part IV.A.
28
29
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federal legislation to protect the exclusive use of trademarks.32
Believing the protection of trade to be one of the principal objects
of government, a Committee on Commerce report identified two
advantages to regulating the use of false trademarks: (1) to ensure
that the mark’s owner can retain the advantage associated with his
own skill or superior quality of goods or services and (2) to give
the public a means to distinguish among different manufacturers’
goods and judge the quality of the articles purchased.33
Congress enacted the first federal law authorizing trademark
registration in 1870 (“the 1870 Act”), and by October 1878, the
federal government had issued more than 7,200 registrations.34
Under the 1870 Act, the following “so-called trade-marks” were
barred from registration: marks that could not become a lawful
trademark; the name of a person, firm, or corporation; marks
identical to prior registered marks; and marks so similar to prior
registered marks as to be likely to deceive the public.35 In
addition, a trademark owner could not enforce a trademark if it
was used or claimed in any unlawful business, was used upon an
injurious article, was fraudulently obtained, or was formed and
used with deceptive intent.36
Because the 1870 Act failed to define trademarks, courts
interpreted the first prohibition as excluding symbols that could
not constitute trademarks under the common law.37 If the
common law prior to 1870 refused to recognize certain marks
based upon scandalousness, then the 1870 Act incorporated the
scandalous registration prohibition. On the other hand, even if
Congress had incorporated a scandalous prohibition in the 1870
Act, it likely did so by mere fortuity as Congress, at that time, had
little knowledge of the parameters of trademarks under the
common law.38 Within a few years of the Act’s passage, in 1879,
H.R. REP. NO. 36-527, at 1 (1860).
Id.; S. REP. NO. 56-43, at 167 (1899) (reprinting all congressional debates).
See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (stating that the Act of August 14,
1876 (19 Stat. 141) added to the 1870 Act by creating penalties for “the fraudulent use,
sale, and counterfeiting of” registered trademarks); H.R. REP. NO. 46-3, at 2 (1879)
(charting the trademarks registered under the 1870 Act).
35 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 79, 16 Stat. 198, 211 (1870), invalidated by The TradeMark Cases, 100 U.S. 82.
36 Id. at 212.
37 BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 247. Marks were refused under the common law if they
fell within one of the following categories: (1) the name of a person, firm, or corporation;
(2) calculated to deceive the public as to the source or character of the good; (3) generic
or descriptive; or (4) distinctive from other marks in the same class. See id. at 105-09, 111,
240 (discussing in part In re R.W. English, Commissioner’s Decisions for 1870 at 142;
Choynski v. Cohen, 39 Cal. 501 (Cal. 1870); Stokes v. Landgraff, 17 Barb. 608 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1853)).
38 With respect to the 1870 Act, Browne noted that “[t]he promoters of the bill had
very little knowledge of the general common law of the matter.” BROWNE II, supra note
29, at 28.
32
33
34
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the Supreme Court struck down the 1870 Act as unconstitutional.39
Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in The Trade-Mark
Cases, Congress recognized the importance of trademarks to the
consuming public and manufacturing companies and the
desirability of having a federal system to protect trademarks.40
Within a month of the decision, the Committee on Manufactures
considered a constitutional amendment to give Congress the
power to grant, protect and regulate the right to adopt and use
trademarks.41 Alternatively, Congress considered passing a more
limited trademark registration act.42
In 1881, Congress chose to enact the more limited act (“the
1881 Act”).43
In an overly cautious attempt to address
constitutionality concerns, the 1881 Act only allowed registration
of marks used in commerce with foreign nations or with Native
American tribes.44 Aside from general registration requirements,
the 1881 Act listed two bars to federal registration: marks
consisting of the applicant’s name and marks for the same class of
goods as registered marks that were either identical or so similar
as to cause a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception for the
public.45 These two registration bars are, in essence, identical to
the second, third, and fourth bars in the 1870 Act.46 The 1881 Act,
however, lacked the 1870 Act’s first registration prohibition, a
specific incorporation of the common law definition of trademark.
Regardless, courts interpreted the 1881 Act as incorporating the
same common law parameters as those set forth in the 1870 Act.47
Almost immediately upon the 1881 Act’s passage, various

39 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 95-99; see also H.R. REP. NO. 46-3, at 2 (1879). Even
though the Supreme Court found the 1870 Act unconstitutional in 1879, the
Commissioner of Patents continued to issue federal trademarks registrations. See H.R.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 46-83, at 1 (1881).
40 H.R. REP. NO. 46-3, at 3 (1879).
41 Id. at 1.
42 H.R. REP. NO. 46-561, at 1, 5 (1880).
The Judiciary Committee opined that
Congress did not have the power to regulate trademarks under the Commerce Clause
because trademarks were not necessary to commerce. Id. at 5. Some members of the
House of Representatives championed this position. See S. REP. NO. 56-43, at 187-90
(1899) (reprinting comments from Representative Hammond from Georgia).
43 Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502.
44 H.R. REP. NO. 51-27, at 1 (1890).
The Committee on Patents persistently
recommended including registration for marks used in interstate commerce. See H.R.
REP. NO. 48-2376, at 1 (1885). However, the Judiciary Committee was equally persistent in
its position that Congress did not have the power to regulate trademarks under the
Commerce Clause. H.R. REP. NO. 51-1749, at 1 (1890); H.R. REP. NO. 46-561, at 5 (1880).
45 Act of March 3, 1881, § 3.
46 The first prohibition in the 1870 Act was construed to mean the name of the
applicant. BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 245.
47 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bronson Co. v. Duell, 17 App. D.C. 471, 479-80 (D.C.
Cir. 1901) (affirming the denial of a registration for EVER-READY for coffee mills as
descriptive) (citing Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901)
(holding that a geographically descriptive term cannot be a valid trademark)).
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groups attempted to amend it, leading to the first suggestion of a
“scandalous” registration prohibition in 1892.48 Amendment
proponents gave three reasons to amend the 1881 Act. First, the
1881 Act needed additional penalty provisions. In 1876, Congress
passed an act to penalize trademark infringement.49 When
Congress enacted the 1881 Act, practitioners improperly assumed
that the 1876 Act’s penalty provisions applied to the 1881 Act, but
the courts held otherwise.50 Thus, some advocated for recreating
the penalty system enacted in 1876. Second, Congress also
reconsidered regulations on labels. Practitioners had difficulties
applying the distinction between a trademark and a label.51 This
nebulous distinction created more confusion than solutions for
merchants attempting to protect themselves, leading Congress to
consider how to consolidate the trademark and label laws into a
cohesive, federal statute.52 Third, many people continued to view
the 1881 Act as incomplete because it did not allow for
registration of trademarks used in interstate commerce. Agreeing
that the constitutional provision governing copyright and patents
does not extend to trademarks, these advocates argued that
Congress had the power to regulate trademarks via the commerce
clause.53
Only the last two proposed amendments would have
substantively changed the scope of trademark protection.
However, an 1892 proposal suggested three substantive changes.
Section 1 of the statute would “limit[] registration to marks and
labels used in foreign or interstate commerce or with Indian tribes,
and to such as are not offensive to public sentiment or morals.”54 In
addition to incorporating two of the previously suggested changes
to trademark scope, this suggested language is notable in its
See, e.g., supra note 44.
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (describing the addition of
penalties); see S. REP. NO. 49-1188, at VII (1886) (attaching the label law while considering
revisions).
50 H.R. REP. NO. 52-1860, at 2-3 (1892); WILLIAM EVARTS RICHARDS & WILLIAM
WALLACE WHITE, UNITED STATES PATENTS, TRADE MARKS, DESIGNS AND COPYRIGHTS 91,
93 n.* (2d ed. 1896) (noting that the penalties in the 1876 act and the 1880 Act “are in
effect one, and should be construed together”). But see S. REP. NO. 56-43, at 194, 204
(1899) (noting that the 1876 Act was unconstitutional). By 1889, it became clear that the
penalties enacted in 1876 did not apply to the 1881 Act. United States v. Koch, 40 F. 250,
252-53 (E.D. Mo. 1889).
51 H.R. REP. NO. 52-1860, at 3 (1892).
52 Id.
53 “Unquestionably, the word ‘commerce’ includes the use of trade-marks in the same
way and for the same reason that it includes telegraphy; and Congress may regulate the
use of trade-marks in the same manner and to the same extent that it can regulate
commerce generally.” ROWLAND COX, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND
ITS RELATION TO THE SUBJECT OF TRADEMARKS: A PAPER READ BEFORE THE BAR
ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 13 (1895?).
54 H.R. REP. NO. 52-1860, at 3 (1892) (emphasis added).
48
49
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exclusion of offensive marks. First, this appears to be the first
instance where Congress was asked to consider a prohibition
based upon offensive language. Second, the Committee did not
recommend revising the 1881 Act to preclude registration of
trademarks on any of the other subsequently added registration
prohibitions in the 1905 Act, such as the prohibition against using
national symbols.
This singular prohibition suggests that
preventing registration of scandalous trademarks holds unique
import. Unfortunately, the Committee failed to explain, in its
report or any other document, why it considered this particular
preclusion important. Third, the prohibition is on trademarks that
offend, rather than merely restricting enforcement of trademarks
associated with businesses that offend. Thus, the Committee indicated
a need to focus on marks rather than merely whether the marks
were associated with unlawful businesses, a restriction included in
another section of both the 1870 and 1881 Acts.55
After years of negotiation, Congress enacted substantial
changes to the federal trademark statute in the Act of February 20,
1905 (“the 1905 Act”).56 The 1905 Act significantly increased the
enumerated reasons why a trademark registration may be barred,
including any mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral or
scandalous matter.”57
Since 1905, Congress has revised the trademark registration
statute several times. Representative Fritz G. Lanham introduced
the most significant restructuring in 1938, eventually enacted as
the Act of July 5, 1946 (“the Lanham Act”).58 The stated purpose
of the Lanham Act amendments was to “place all matters relating
to trade-marks in one statute and to eliminate judicial obscurity, to
simplify registration and to make it stronger and more liberal, to
dispense with mere technical prohibitions and arbitrary
provisions, to make procedure simple, and relief against
infringement prompt and effective.”59 Irrespective of this purpose,
the Lanham Act did not clarify the scandalous registration
prohibition. In fact, the specific language of the scandalous
registration prohibition did not change until 1994, when it
became the following: “Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive,
or scandalous matter.”60 The various congressional bodies that

55 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 84, 16 Stat. 198, 212; Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138,
§ 8, 16 Stat. 504.
56 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724.
57 Id. at 725.
58 Act of July 5, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511127 (2006)).
59 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1274 (1946).
60 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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have amended the Lanham Act over the years have not been
troubled by a lack of definition or parameters for “scandalous
matter” but have repeated the phrasing regarding scandalous
matter with minimal alteration for about a century.
B. Historical Roots for the Scandalous Registration Prohibition
The 1905 Act significantly increased the number of
enumerated registration prohibitions and was “intended to permit
the registration of all marks which, under the common law as
expounded by the courts, could be considered trademarks, and
become the exclusive property of the person using it as his
trademark.”61 Little in the legislative history, however, describes
the scope of the scandalous registration prohibition.
The
common law, therefore, is one source likely to provide further
guidance. The pre-1870 law is pertinent in evaluating the general
landscape of trademark law. While it does not specifically explain
why Congress enacted a scandalous registration prohibition, it
does elucidate the state of trademark law as Congress considered
creating a registry. Of more relevance, the common law created
between the 1870 Act and the 1905 Act clarifies why Congress may
have added the scandalous registration prohibition (and other
prohibitions) to the 1905 trademark registration regime.
Moreover, while Congress contemplated revisions to the 1881
Act, it also considered the trademark registration regimes of
various foreign countries, particularly those in Europe and the
other Americas. Several influential foreign countries added a
scandalous registration prohibition to their trademark registration
regimes before Congress passed the 1905 Act. The climate of
trademark law on a national and international level at the time
indicates that Congress may have been significantly influenced
while drafting the 1905 Act by both preexisting United States law
and international registration regimes.
1. Common Law in the United States
Before the first treatise on trademarks appeared in 1860,
United States common law regarding trademarks was difficult to
discern and thus, often led to confusion among practitioners, in
the courts, and in the general public.62 As summarized in Francis
Upton’s groundbreaking treatise on trademark law, the common
law described the right to adopt any mark in broad terms: a
manufacturer had the right to adopt any mark that could serve as
61 ARTHUR P. GREELEY, REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARKS UNDER THE NEW TRADEMARK
ACT OF THE UNITED STATES WITH NOTES ON THE ACT 11-12 (1905).
62 BROWNE I, supra note 2, at vi; see also UPTON, supra note 7, at 4.
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a source-identifier as long as the mark was not generic, descriptive,
or previously appropriated.63 Additionally, pre-1860 courts refused
to enforce trademarks that were fraudulent or deceptive.64
Regarding trademarks and scandalousness or immorality,
Upton made only one relevant but somewhat mysterious
statement. In the context of discussing the proscription on
deceptive trademarks and the pro-competitive effect of trademark
protection, Upton stated that “[n]o just reason can be assigned
why, upon similar grounds, this salutary [trademark] protection
should not be extended, in like manner, to every business and
occupation that is not positively immoral in its character, or vicious in
its tendency.”65
Assuming that the terms “scandalous” and
“immoral” are to be given distinct meanings in the 1905 Act’s
registration prohibition, this statement would, at most, inform the
common law precursor to the immorality portion of the 1905 Act.
Unfortunately, Upton did not clarify or expand upon this
statement.
One interpretation of Upton’s statement, merely based upon
its language, is that trademark protection should not be granted
to, or courts cannot enforce a trademark for, businesses based
solely upon the business’ nature rather than upon the mark’s
nature. Certainly, some courts would not only agree with such an
assessment but would extend it to an extreme degree. For
example, Justice Clerke of the Supreme Court of New York County
noted that “[i]t is unquestionably the duty of courts to regard with
disfavor every establishment having any tendency to corrupt the
public morals, to create idle or dissipated habits, to encourage a
craving for undue excitement, or to impair the taste for domestic
attachments and domestic society.”66 If Justice Clerke’s statements
served as a foundation for a general understanding of immorality,
many common trademarks would immediately fall into disrepute
merely because they are perceived by some as associated with
businesses that encourage idleness or undue excitement.67
Fortunately, no subsequent courts endorsed Justice Clerke’s stated
position.68
UPTON, supra note 7, at 85-88.
See, e.g., id. at 62-71, 100-02. In particular, courts appear to consider deception as an
imposition upon the general public. Id. at 90 (“But he must not, by any deceitful or other
practice, impose upon the public . . . .” (citing Howard v. Henriques, 3 Sand. S.C.R. 725)).
65 UPTON, supra note 7, at 95 (emphasis added).
66 Christy v. Murphy, 12 How. Pr. 77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856).
67 Given the breadth of Justice Clerke’s interpretation of immorality, many trademarks
could have been barred as immoral due to the associated business’ propensity for
encouraging undue excitement or to create idleness, such as PLAYERS HAVE MORE
FUN for the Illinois Lottery or GRAND THEFT AUTO: SAN ANDREAS for a computer
role-playing game.
68 The author was unable to find any cases that referred to this language. Moreover, a
63
64
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A prominent legal scholar of the late nineteenth century,
William Henry Browne, also noted that any business conflicting
with the morals of the time should not be able to enforce
trademark and unfair competition rights.69 His specific examples
of unlawful businesses included those that use trademarks on
obscene publications, on articles used in committing acts of vice,
while trading with the enemy during a time of war, and while
engaging in a business that violates the laws of another nation.70
Browne’s examples all consist of businesses that, in and of
themselves, should not be able to enforce any legal rights,
including trademark rights.71 These “unlawful” businesses may be
divided into two categories. First, there are businesses that may be
considered immoral when evaluated in light of the mores of the
time, such as an obscene publication or an article used in
committing acts of vice. One can neither determine what
constitutes obscenity or a vice, nor determine whether obscenity
and the identified vices are prohibited, without assessing society’s
standards at that time.72 At least one type of “unlawful” business
seems to be more of an absolute prohibition without need to
reference the mores of the time: trading with the enemy during
times of a declared war.73 These unlawful businesses indicate that
there are some forms of “immorality” that are per se immoral
prominent legal scholar accorded a slightly different purpose for this language, namely, as
being one of the many reasons courts give for judicially intervening in a trademark
dispute. BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 70-71. Even so, Browne focused the weight of his
regard upon the theory that judicial intervention is warranted to prevent fraud upon the
public and that the prevention of fraud is the moral and legal obligations of the court. Id.
at 68-71.
69 Id. at 342.
70 Id.; BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 263-64.
71 See also RICHARDS & WHITE, supra note 50, at 91(noting that trademarks used on
obscene publications or used in acts of vice cannot be enforced because the business is
unlawful).
72 These businesses require both inquiries because, even if a vice is recognized, it still
may not be legally prohibited. For example, gluttony is one of the seven deadly sins, but
society’s standards have not legally prohibited gluttony as a vice. A better comparative
example may be cannibalism. Almost universally throughout its history, the United States
has condemned cannibalism, whereas there are other cultures that do not find
cannibalism to be a vice. Clare Murphy, Cannibalism: A Modern Taboo, BBC NEWS, Dec. 2,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3254074.stm (noting cultures that accept
cannibalism).
73 One can argue that trading with the enemy during a time of war also has an element
of relativity in that one may need to assess what constitutes a “war” and who is the
“enemy.” However, the concept of trading with the enemy falls more as a per se
prohibition in that, once an enemy is identified and a war has begun, exchanging
commerce with that enemy is unlawful. See, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 12
U.S.C. § 95(a) (2006) (giving the President the power to regulate trade during times of
war). But see Robert W. McGee, Legal Ethics, Business Ethics, and International Trade: Some
Neglected Issues, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 109, 166-67 & n.255 (2002) (arguing that
economic sanctions are warranted to avoid selling supplies to the enemy but noting that
Serbs often sold food and clothing to the starving Bosnian army during the conflict
between the two ethnic groups).
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whereas others require contextual evaluation.
Although Browne lists these unlawful businesses, he does not
provide any examples where a court refused to enforce a
trademark because of its use in an unlawful business. Before the
1905 Act, however, there was one group of cases where courts
often refused to enforce trademark rights because of the
“morality” of the business: cases involving “quack medicine.”74
Regardless of the various courts’ ultimate decisions regarding
whether to enforce the trademarks, the relevant portions of the
courts’ consideration focused on the morality or immorality of the
business rather than that of the associated trademarks. Thus, as
one contemporary legal scholar noted, “[a] complainant, whose
business is imposition, cannot invoke the aid of equity against the
piracy of his trademarks.”75
Even so, courts became reluctant to prohibit enforcement of
“quack medicine” trademarks per se. These courts questioned
whether quack medicine constituted an unlawful business such
that the practitioners’ trademark rights should not be enforced,
particularly when the purported medicines either had doubtful
medicinal properties or otherwise were harmless.76 Thus, Judge
Sutherland in the New York courts noted the following:
[I]f these pills are an innocent humbug, by which both parties
are trying to make money, I doubt whether it is my duty, on
those questions of property, of right and wrong between the
parties, to stop outside of the case, and abridge the innocent
individual liberty which all persons must be presumed to have
in common, of suffering themselves to be humbugged.77

Eventually, the Supreme Court resolved any debate regarding
enforceability of trademarks for quack medicines by stating that
trademark law was insufficient, standing alone, to preclude
enforcement of “quack medicine” trademarks.78 As long as the
associated product was not harmful, courts could not fail to
74 E.g., Fowle v. Spear, 9 F. Cas. 611 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1847) (No. 4,996) (stating that
quack medicine manufacturers cannot invoke equity courts to protect a label, termed a
trademark); Smith v. Woodruff, 48 Barb. 438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867) (considering it
“beneath the dignity of a court of justice” to enforce a quack compound that is harmful
but advertised as safe or a compound that is useless); BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 359
(stating that quack medicine manufacturer is not entitled to invoke equity courts).
75 CHARLES E. CODDINGTON, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS AS PRESENTED IN
THE REPORTED ADJUDICATIONS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN,
IRELAND, CANADA, AND FRANCE, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 169
(Ward & Peloubet 1878).
76 See, e.g., Fetridge v. Merchant, 4 Abb. Pr. 156 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857) (noting in dicta an
inclination to follow judges that will enforce rights when the article is innocuous or
useful); see also Curtis v. Bryan, 2 Daly 312, 319 (1868) (rejecting claim that the “quack
medicine” in use for more than twenty years was harmful to children).
77 Comstock v. White, 10 Abb. Pr. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860).
78 See, e.g., Worden v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 527 (1903).
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enforce trademark rights based upon the legitimacy of the
associated product.
As various courts and legal scholars believed that “unlawful”
businesses should not be able to enforce trademark rights, the
1870 Act and 1881 Act reflected the same proposition. Section 84
of the 1870 Act and Section 8 of the 1881 Act prohibited
enforcement of a trademark used in any “unlawful business” or
upon any injurious article.79 This language is merely a codification
of the equity court principles, which would prevent trademark
enforcement when the marks were used to promote sales that are
unlawful, such as sales of assassin’s tools.80
Assuming that Upton was referring to these types of unlawful
businesses as immoral, his statement that trademark protection
should not be extended to immoral businesses and occupations
has only limited value in informing the scope of the scandalous
registration prohibition. When Congress added the scandalous
registration prohibition in the 1905 Act, it also retained the right
to refuse to enforce trademarks used in unlawful businesses.81 If
one were to assume that unlawful businesses encompassed the
same scope as immoral trademarks, having both provisions in the
1905 Act would be redundant. Moreover, if Congress intended
the two provisions to encompass the same scope, one would
expect it to use the same terms. As Congress did not use the same
terms, it is more likely that the prohibition against enforcing
unlawful businesses, and the examples of unlawful businesses,
reflected more upon equity courts’ general refusal to enforce
unlawful businesses rather than upon trademark law and the
limitations on acquiring a property right in a trademark.82 For
these unlawful businesses, the fact that the dispute involves
79 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 84, 16 Stat. 198, 212; Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, § 8,
21 Stat. 502, 504. By injurious articles, Browne and others identified that these are goods
that are per se unlawful, such as adulterated foods and assassin’s tools, rather than those
that can be perverted from lawful purposes, such as intoxicating liquors. RICHARDS &
WHITE, supra note 50, at 91 (would not include “poisons, explosives, [and] weapons used
in warfare”); BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 265.
80 Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C.I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1930)
(discussing the same language in a later incarnation of the trademark act).
81 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 21, 33 Stat. 724, 729.
82 Courts of equity will not assist a plaintiff with unclean hands to effectuate his or her
wrongful, illegal purpose. See, e.g., UPTON, supra note 7, at 40; Dunning v. Bathrick, 41 Ill.
425 (Ill. 1866); Phippen v. Durham, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.) 457, 472 (Va. 1852) (citing 1 Story’s
Equ. Jur. § 64, e). For example, the equity court in Piddings v. Howe, 8 Simons R. 479,
refused to enforce plaintiff’s trademark rights because plaintiff falsely represented the
procuring method and composition of the teas used to create his final product, known as
Hoqua’s Mixture, supposedly after the man who created the mixture. Fetridge v.
Merchant, 4 Abb. Pr. 156 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857) (discussing Piddings). In fact, the mixture
had never been made or used by Howqua. BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 363. The refusal
was not based upon the trademark rights, or lack thereof, but upon plaintiff’s unclean
hands.
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trademark enforcement is almost incidental. The identified
problem was with the business practices and not with the trademark
matter.
In addition to unlawful businesses, Browne discussed one
example of an immoral business. Monks in Bordeaux exported
white wine to Turkey under the mark MINERAL WATER even
though Turks, by their religion, were forbidden from drinking
alcohol.83 Businessmen in Burgundy, hearing about the Bordeaux
success, undertook the same business practice using the same
MINERAL WATER mark. While this scenario would be ripe for an
unfair competition claim, Browne supposed that the Bordeaux
monks would not have standing due to their “immoral” business
practice of marking an alcoholic product as water and then selling
the product to people who are forbidden from drinking alcohol.84
Browne specifically rejected the supposition that the monks would
have no standing because the MINERAL WATER mark was
deceptively indicating that the product was a kind of water rather
than alcohol.85 In Browne’s view, no one was deceived.86 Rather, it
is the business of enticing Turks to violate a tenant of their
religion, rather than the mark, that led Browne to suppose that
the monks had no recourse.
Browne’s example confirms that an unlawful business under
the pre-1905 common law is one that violated any religion’s
beliefs. Interpreting this example as a common law precursor to
the immorality portion of the scandalous registration prohibition,
one can extrapolate that Congress intended the registration
prohibition to protect any religion’s terms and images from use by
trademark owners. Moreover, such a prohibition would serve the
original purpose of trademark regulation. As the PTO noted in its
rejection of the Masonic emblem, the quasi-religious icon could
not serve as an adequate source-identifier.87 Likewise, Browne also
presumed that a trademark for CHRISTIAN would be rejected
because of its strong connection to a religious faith, precluding it
from adequately serving as a merchant’s source-identifier.88 On
the other hand, symbols that had lost their religious significance,
like the Maltese cross, could adequately serve as trademarks
because they would not offend anyone.89 Thus, under Browne’s

BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 51-52.
Id.; BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 92-93.
BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 52.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 239-40.
Id. at 240 (noting that the “most bigoted” found no fault with using the crescent, a
Muslim symbol, to trade with the Turks).
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
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discussion of the common law protection for trademarks,
trademarks that expressly adopt religious terms or icons are
improper trademarks because the marks cannot serve the essential
purpose of a trademark, namely, a means to identify the source.90
In light of this common law approach, the registration prohibition
on immoral marks fits into the general purpose of the regulatory
scheme—to prevent registration of marks that cannot serve as an
adequate source-identifier.
There is a second potential meaning to Upton’s mysterious
statement. Upton may be casting as immoral the situation where
the business is improper because the mark, when considered in
light of the associated goods, is deceptive. For example, the case
of Fetridge v. Wells evaluated whether the trademark BALM OF
THOUSAND FLOWERS, associated with “quack medicine,”
should be protected.91 The court stated:
[I]f the plaintiff and his firm are themselves engaged in the
execution of a systematic plan for deceiving the public . . . by
false representations of the composition, qualities and uses of the liquid
compound which they invite the public to buy, . . . a court of
equity would violate its principles and abuse its powers by
consenting to aid them by an injunction or otherwise, in
accomplishing their design.92

Unlike the courts that refused to enforce trademarks associated
with quack medicine, the Fetridge court first focused on the
deceptive nature of the mark (falsely representing the
compound’s ingredients) and then discussed the nature of the
business (purportedly selling healing substances when it was
merely soap).93 Even after discussing the nature of the business,
the court quickly restated that its purpose in doing so was to
determine whether the trademark was intended for the purpose of
deceiving and actually would deceive the public.94
90 Unlike subsequent PTO decisions that identified the use of religious symbols as
marks as scandalous, Browne does not draw any distinction between using religious marks
on “immoral” products and using religious marks on other products, including those
associated with the religion. Rather, it is the use of a religious symbol in connection with
trade that is improper. Id. at 239-40.
91 UPTON, supra note 7, at 36-39 (discussing Fetridge v. Wells, 4 Abb. Pr. 144 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1857)). Another case, Fetridge v. Merchant, 4 Abb. Pr. 156 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857), which
had very similar facts, was decided at nearly the same time by another judge in the same
court. In that case, Judge Hoffman decided that the mark was more fanciful than
deceptively descriptive and, thus, should be accorded trademark protection. See BROWNE
I, supra note 2, at 168-69.
92 Fetridge v. Wells, 4 Abb. Pr. 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857) (emphasis added).
93 Id.
94 See id.
The proof is, therefore, complete, that the name was given and is used to
deceive the public; to attract and impose upon purchasers; that, in the sense
that the plaintiff means it shall convey, it is a representation to the public that
he finds to be useful and knows to be false.
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By quickly refocusing the discussion on the BALM OF
THOUSAND FLOWERS mark, the Fetridge court honed in on the
specific manner in which the mark must interact with the product
before the mark is considered improper—or perhaps immoral—
namely, marks cannot be enforced when they are deceptively
descriptive.95 Both Upton and subsequent courts perceived the
Fetridge case as standing for the proposition that deceptively
descriptive trademarks are improper.96 Reinforcing the notion
that deceptively descriptive marks may be immoral and, thus,
should not be registered, Browne also identifies a deceptively
descriptive trademark as unlawful and immoral.97 Thus, one could
argue that the pre-1870 common law would consider a mark
immoral if it were deceptively descriptive; notably, such marks
would be immoral regardless of the mores of the time.
The structure of the 1905 Act, however, belies any indication
that Congress referred to, or intended to include, deceptive
trademarks in the immoral portion of the scandalous registration
prohibition. In the 1870 and 1881 Acts, the clause that prohibits
enforcement of unlawful businesses or injurious articles also
prohibits, in nearly identical language, courts from enforcing any
trademark “which has been formed and “used with the design of
deceiving the public in the purchase” or use of any article “of
merchandise.”98 As with the “unlawful businesses” provision,
Congress retained this bar when it added the scandalous

Id. In dicta, the court also noted other evidence of plaintiff’s deception, including an
advertisement that misled the public regarding how much plaintiff paid for the rights to
the compound and misrepresentations regarding the compound’s benefits. Id.
95 See BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 155-71 (subsequently discussing both deceptiveness
and descriptiveness); see also Coats v. Holbrook, Nelson & Co., 2 Sand. Ch. 586 (N.Y. Ch.
1845) (finding that there was no good faith or morality in transaction when deceiving the
public via passing off). Browne also referenced the Fetridge v. Wells case to note that the
Patent Office will determine when a proposed mark is calculated to deceive and reject it
accordingly. BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 227-28.
96 See, e.g., Worden v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 528-32 (1903) (discussing
Fetridge while refusing to enforce a trademark because it fraudulently represented that the
associated product contained figs); Manhattan Med. Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 222-25
(1883) (rights in trademark are forfeited upon misrepresentation as to the manufacturer
and manufacturing location for the medicine); Grocers Journal Co. v. Midland Publ’g
Co., 105 S.W. 310, 315-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907) (summarizing Fetridge as denying trademark
protection due to its deceptively descriptive nature); see also BROWNE II, supra note 29, at
78-79.
97 Shortly after the Civil War, a Massachusetts boot-maker stamped as trademarks the
likeness and signature of Robert E. Lee along with the Confederacy’s six stars. BROWNE II,
supra note 29, at 343. The PTO refused registration because the marks “tended to . . .
keep alive . . . sectional feeling[s]” and were deceptive since the boot-maker was a
Northern, not Southern, business. Id. at 343-44. It appears that Browne believes that this
business was unlawful because of the deception. Id. at 344 (suggesting that the mark may
have been allowed registration if the applicants were Southern manufacturers).
98 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 84, 16 Stat. 198, 212; Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, § 8,
21 Stat. 502, 504.
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registration prohibition to the 1905 Act.99 Thus, if one were to
assume that immoral trademarks encompassed deceptively
descriptive trademarks, having both provisions in the 1905 Act
would have been redundant. Moreover, Congress subsequently
amended the scandalous registration prohibition to add in specific
language prohibiting deceptive trademarks.100
In so doing,
Congress reaffirmed that the immoral trademark prohibition was
not intended to include deceptively descriptive trademarks.
Despite the scant pre-1905 common law addressing immoral
or scandalous trademarks, at least one legal scholar was not silent
regarding morality or scandalousness in the context of
trademarks. The first edition of Browne’s treatise, published
shortly after the 1870 Act, extolled trademark owners to choose
trademarks with propriety.101 Browne reiterated this discussion in
the treatise’s second edition, published shortly after the 1881 Act
was passed.102 According to Browne, a lawful mark “must not
transgress the rules of morality or public policy.”103 Thus, he
recommended choosing a mark that does not shock the
sensibilities of anyone in the world on the basis of moral, religious,
or political grounds by “the perversion of an emblem sacred in
their eyes.”104 Browne further opined that, without support in case
law, judges would not enforce a trademark comprised of any
religious emblem.105
Two essential points should be noted. First, in Browne’s
estimation, the 1870 and 1881 Acts would prohibit marks that lack
propriety—marks that were scandalous or immoral.
These
improper marks are ones that have political, religious, or moral
content. As discussed below, these are precisely the types of marks
that the PTO and courts have evaluated under the scandalous
registration prohibition. Second, Browne discusses these marks as
being improper regardless of the goods with which they are
associated, indicating that these marks should be per se prohibited.
Browne’s only example of a mark potentially lacking propriety
further reinforces this point: an entity with a German registration
submitted a trademark application consisting of a sitting, smiling,
and drunken devil carrying six bottles.106 Although the PTO
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 729.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 464.
BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 607.
BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 465.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 464-65. In fact, Browne makes his statements regarding propriety in contrast
to “blindly follow[ing] the loose, random sayings of judges, that any emblem may be
lawfully employed for [commerce].” Id. at 464.
106 Id. at 465.
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
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eventually allowed registration of the mark, Browne expressed
outrage because the mark “might possibly convey a moral lesson
by an association of ideas.”107 Browne noted that, if the mark
depicted the devil venerated by followers, it would have been “an
atrocious libel, and must have been rejected on that account.”108
Notably, Browne never discussed, or even identified, the
associated good, medicine bitters, indicating that the mark should
be evaluated for impropriety (or immorality) without reference to
the associated goods.109
Congress did not include the 1905 additional registration
prohibitions in a vacuum. As recognized by Congress and Arthur
Greeley, the architect of the 1905 Act, the registration
prohibitions were intended to permit registration of all marks that
could function as trademarks under the preexisting United States
common law and to prohibit registration for all marks considered
improper under the common law.110 The common law landscape
prior to 1905 indicates that some scholars and the PTO pondered
whether trademark protection should extend to marks consisting
of, or referring to, illegal, political, religious, or other moral
matters. Given these considerations, the scandalous registration
prohibition likely was intended to prevent registration for marks
that connote illegal acts or political matter, and the immoral
marks prohibition likely was intended to prevent registration for
marks containing terms or icons associated with a religion or
otherwise referring to moral matters. Thus, both portions of the
scandalous registration prohibition had their roots in the preexisting common law.
2. The Influence of International Trademark Law
in the United States
While the United States common law laid an important
foundation for the 1905 Act, foreign law was also considered an
important source of trademark law. Legal scholars often referred
to the more developed trademark law of foreign countries,
particularly those of England, France, and other European
nations, to evaluate appropriate principles for United States law111
Id.
Id.
See Patent and Trademark Depository Library Association, History,
http://www.ptdla.org/history (follow “Trademarks 1870-1873” hyperlink to open .xls file)
(last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
110 See GREELEY, supra note 61, at 11-12, 36 (reproducing comments from the House of
Representatives Committee on Patents when recommending the 1905 Act).
111 See, e.g., COX, supra note 53, at 22-23 (referring to all “civilized” nations, including
Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Japan, Italy,
Switzerland, Russia, Denmark, and the Argentine Confederation); BROWNE I, supra note 2,
107
108
109
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and even to define a “trademark.”112 Congress also considered
coordinating trademark regulation at an international level well
before the 1905 Act.113 In fact, one of the motivations for enacting
the 1870 Act was to comport with treaty obligations giving
trademark rights to citizens of Belgium, France, and Russia.114
Foreign trademark law appears to have shifted between
approximately 1860 and 1885 towards having a registration system
and subsequently shifted again towards including certain
registration prohibitions.
American law appears to have
developed on a parallel, if later, track.
According to documents revealing their perceptions and
knowledge, American commentators and lawmakers were aware of
few foreign jurisdictions with a registration system before the 1870
Act. Austria’s law of December 7, 1858, was the most developed
115
registration system.
The law provided for exclusive use of a
trademark in connection with the associated merchandise after
registration and contained several registration prohibitions.116
France, the Bavarian and Wirtemberg portions of the German
Empire, Sardinia and Italy, and Russia also had registration
systems of some sort before the 1870 Act, although some were less
developed or narrower in scope than others.117 Great Britain’s
House of Commons considered, but did not adopt, a registration
system before the 1870 Act.118 None of the enacted registration
systems had specific prohibitions related to scandalous or immoral
marks.119
According to compilations by American scholars and
lawmakers, the foreign jurisdictions with extensive trademark
at vi-ix, 560-73. Moreover, knowledge of international trademark regimes was important
as a matter of comity. COX, supra note 53, at 17. This point became particularly clear
when the Tribunal of Commerce of Geneva noted in 1859 that a trademark should be
protected as the manufacturer’s property under the law of nations. Id.
112 See, e.g., BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 98-100.
113 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 56-43, at 167-68 (1899) (reprinting Representative Cleveland’s
comments for the 1870 Act, which referred to French and English law); BROWNE I, supra
note 2, at v (discussing commercial treatise, conventions, and diplomatic compacts).
114 S. REP. NO. 56-43, at 167-68 (noting that, under these treaties, non-citizens received
significantly more trademark protection than American citizens).
115 All references to international law are garnered from treatises and congressional
records contemporaneous to the time period when the United States enacted various
trademark provisions. Relying upon these sources to identify relevant international law is
more important than determining the actual foreign law because they demonstrate the
United States perception of foreign law and, thus, what influenced the creation of the
United States trademark provisions.
116 BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 560-61 (summaries or reprinting of relevant acts).
117 Id. at 560-63, 569-73; BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 697.
Despite the lack of
registration prohibitions in the French Act, Browne perceived the 1870 Act as very similar
to the French registration legislation. BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 193.
118 BROWNE I, supra note 2, at 565 & n.1. In fact, the first act for trademark registration
in Great Britain was passed in 1875. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 5:3 n.1.
119 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 5:3 n.1.
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registration systems grew in short order. Between 1870 and 1885,
the following countries enacted new trademark registration system
or refined their preexisting system: Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland.120
Particularly in the 1880s and 1890s, while Congress wrestled
with creating its own trademark regime, it kept abreast of
changing trademark regimes among various countries.121 This
international focus was required to effectuate United States
participation in efforts to coordinate enforcement of trademark
rights. Through these efforts, U.S. lawmakers were exposed to the
idea of expressly prohibiting registration of “immoral” or
“scandalous” marks.
For example, Article 6 of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris
Convention”), first joined by the United States in 1887, expressly
allows treaty members to reject trademark registration if the
trademark is contrary to morals and to public order.122
By 1890, the United States agreed to participate in the
International American Conference, where leaders from both
North and South America considered, among other subjects, the
best method to protect each country’s trademarks from
infringement and forgery in the other American countries.123 In
preparation for the conference, the Senate reviewed a summary of
trademark laws in various North and South American countries.124
The pre-conference summary and subsequent publications advised
that several North and South American countries would not
register trademarks containing scandalous material, including
Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Mexico.125

BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 680-83, 688-701, 703-05.
See, e.g., H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 48-34, at 316-19 (1885) (Sweden and Norway’s
trademark laws); H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 48-12, pt. 4, at 683-88 (1884) (Japan’s trademark
law and by-laws); H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 48-12, pt. 2, at 675-77 (1884) (discussing Great
Britain’s trademark registration system); H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 47-39, at 223 (1883)
(discussing Brazil’s trademark registration system); H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 47-65, at 529-35
(1882) (discussing Austria-Hungary’s trademark law).
122 H.R. REP. NO. 51-3281, at 5 (1890); see also Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/index.html; 5
MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 29:22.
123 S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 51-177, at 1-2 (1890).
124 S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 51-57, at 60 illus. (1890).
125 Id. In the 1891 first edition of the Handbook of the American Republics, the following
countries maintained a prohibition on registering scandalous marks: Argentine Republic
and Uruguay (“[D]esigns or expressions contrary to morals”), Brazil (“[W]ords, pictures,
or allegories which involve offence to either individuals or the public decorum . . .”), and
Canada (“[C]ontains any immorality or scandalous figure . . .”). S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 52-8,
pt. 2, at 354, 357, 359 (1891). By the second edition in 1893, Mexico also had a
prohibition against registering a “mark against public morals.” S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 52-149,
at 495 (1893).
120
121
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Of the various foreign regimes to which Congress was
exposed during the 1880s and 1890s, the prohibitions on
scandalous or immoral trademarks were perceived as falling into
three categories: (1) countries that did not prohibit or otherwise
restrict registration on the basis of scandal or immorality; (2)
countries that simply prohibited scandalous or immoral marks;
and (3) countries that prohibited marks intended to be
scandalous or immoral. The first category included Belgium,
Japan, and Romania.126 The second category included: Brazil,
Canada (the revised 1879 statute), Germany, Great Britain,127 the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland,128 as well as the
Argentine Republic, Uruguay, and Mexico.129 Of these countries,
only Canada specifically prohibited both immoral and scandalous
marks.130 Denmark’s statute fell into the third category.131
After being exposed to these various international regimes
and treaties, Congress first considered adding a prohibition
against scandalous marks in 1892, when it considered whether to
prohibit marks that are “offensive to public sentiment or
morals.”132 Although there is no indication that the drafters
referred to other countries’ registration regimes, the proposed
language is nearly identical to the Netherlands’ prohibition on
“words or designs offensive to pubic order or good morals.”133 By
1900, the Commissioners appointed to revise trademark laws
“propose[d] to review . . . salient features of foreign trademark
laws which are of interest to our citizens and which may aid in
coming to a conclusion as to what should be incorporated into
such a law.”134 These Commissioners proceeded to consider the
“scandalous” provision of many international regimes, including
that of the Paris Convention.135 The Commissioners’ proposed bill
BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 680-81, 697-701.
In addition to the prohibition on scandalous designs, Great Britain also accorded
complete discretion to the comptroller-general of patents, designs, and trademarks to
refuse registration to a trademark where the use of the mark would, in his opinion, be
contrary to law and morality. Id. at 696.
128 Id. at 681-83, 688-97, 700-01, 703-05 (based upon Browne’s summary of the relevant
statutes). Countries that only prohibited scandalous marks are Brazil, Germany, and
Great Britain, whereas the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland prohibited
marks based upon morality. Id.
129 S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 52-149, at 495 (1893).
130 BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 682.
131 See id. at 683-85. According to the Denmark Law, “Registration of the declaration
shall be refused . . . [i]f it contains objects calculated to provoke public scandal.” Id. at
684.
132 See text accompanying supra note 54.
133 BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 700.
134 S. DOC. NO. 56-20, at 40 (1902) (referred to the Committee on Patents on
December 4, 1900).
135 Id. at 42-43, 55 (noting that the provisions in article 6 of the Paris Convention are
essentially French in origin and that some countries prohibit registration of “marks not
126
127
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included a prohibition against “[a] mark contrary to good
morals.”136 After summarizing United States trademark history,
the dissenting Commissioner, Arthur P. Greeley, proposed
prohibiting any mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral or
scandalous matter,”137 which is the precise language included in
the 1905 Act.138 Notably, Greeley specifically incorporated his
keen awareness of foreign trademark law, based upon the
“comparative study of [f]oreign [p]atent and [t]rademark [l]aws”
that he published just prior to 1905.139
The ultimate language included in the 1905 Act can fairly be
described as a broad version of the various scandalous
prohibitions enacted by other countries, and it also included
several additional prohibitions that appeared in the registration
regimes of other countries.140 The breadth of the Act indicates
that the United States examined the laws in other jurisdictions and
then created the broadest protection for its own citizens.
Certainly, Congress enacted the 1905 Act in a trademark
landscape, both in the United States common law and abroad,
that steered it towards including a prohibition on scandalous and
immoral marks.141
III. THE SCANDALOUS REGISTRATION PROHIBITION
A. Marks that Contain Scandalous Matter
One would imagine that, shortly after enacting the 1905 Act,
someone would endeavor to explain the new registration
prohibition on scandalous matter. Yet, trademark treatises and

subject to the rules of good morals”).
136 Id. at 66.
137 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5(a), 33 Stat. 724, 725.
138 S. DOC. NO. 56-20, at 130.
139 GREELEY, supra note 61, at preface.
In 1905, Greeley’s credentials included
membership in the Patent Law Association of Washington, membership in the
commission to revise patent and trademark laws, membership in the American Bar
Association, and serving as Assistant Commissioner of Patents. Id. at tit. p. In notes
explaining the proposed prohibitions, Greeley only mentions that the purpose of the
section was to provide for registration of all marks that the Supreme Court would hold as
capable of being trademarks. S. DOC. NO. 56-20, at 130. As discussed supra Part II.B.1,
however, there was no definitive and preexisting Supreme Court case law that prohibited
registration of marks that consist of or comprise immoral or scandalous matter, and the
Commissioner’s majority report indicates that foreign law had a significant influence
upon the Commission.
140 S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 51-57, 60 illus. (1890). Canada, the other country that expressly
included scandal and immorality in its prohibition, limited it to scandalous or immoral
“figures” rather than scandalous and immoral matter. BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 682.
141 Of course, one cannot say that American law exactly mapped foreign law, as there
were often contradictions even among different foreign jurisdictions. For example, as
pointed out by Browne, France would accept arbitrary words as valid marks, but Germany
refused registration of word marks. BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 105.

ABDEL-KHALIK.4.12.07.STEPHEN

200

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

5/18/2007 2:45:11 PM

[Vol. 25:173

manuals published shortly thereafter shied away from discussing
the scandalous registration prohibition even while discussing
Therefore, to determine what
various other restrictions.142
constituted “scandalous,” courts turned to dictionary definitions to
give the term its ordinary and common meaning and, once
available, to prior court and administrative decisions.143 By 1938,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, an early trademark
appellate body, defined “scandalous” as “shocking to the sense of
propriety or call out condemnation.”144 Under this definition,
various entities have considered at least six categories of marks as
potentially including scandalous material: political imagery;
religious terms and icons; race, gender, and sexual orientation;
sexual matter (vulgar); profanity (vulgar); and illegality.
1. Political Imagery
While not expressly relying upon the scandalous registration
prohibition, the first true consideration of the scandalous
registration prohibition occurred in a 1909 decision, in which the
PTO refused to register the portrait and signature of Grover
Cleveland as a trademark for cigars.145 The applicant had a signed
letter from President Cleveland authorizing use of his name as a
trademark.146 Despite believing that that 1905 Act did not
expressly prohibit such marks, the PTO refused the registration,
stating that the mark’s use detracted from presidential dignity and
thus was against public policy.147 In a subsequent decision, the
PTO speculated that the true basis for rejecting the Cleveland
mark was because the mark was scandalous as it was “offensive to
good taste.”148 In another decision, however, the PTO reached the
opposite conclusion when evaluating an application to register
Thomas Jefferson’s portrait for certain electrical apparatuses,
finding that the mark was not scandalous.149
142 For example, a 1911 trademark manual written for businessmen, addresses
numerous prohibitions, including several that are not on the face of the 1905 Act, such as
the prohibition against registration of the Red Cross insignia, but does not discuss what
may constitute a scandalous mark. J. WALTER THOMPSON COMPANY, THINGS TO KNOW
ABOUT TRADE-MARKS: A MANUAL OF TRADE-MARK INFORMATION 3, 26-42 (1911).
143 See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485-86 (C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Riverbank Canning
Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
144 Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d at 328; see also McGinley, 660 F.2d at 485 n.10 (noting
that Congress did not change or clarify the scope of the prohibition when it revised the
Lanham Act nearly eight years later).
145 Ex parte Banner Cigar Mfg. Co., 1909 C.D. 9, 10.
146 Ex parte Jefferson Elec. Mfg., 1917 C.D. 71, 71-72. The PTO may have questioned
the validity of the letter as it was dated 1900, but the applicant did not submit his
trademark application until after President Cleveland had died in 1908. Id. at 72.
147 Ex parte Banner Cigar Mfg. Co., 1909 C.D. at 10.
148 Ex parte Jefferson Elec. Mfg., 1917 C.D. at 72.
149 Id. at 71.
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One of the earliest reported decisions expressly relying upon
the scandalous registration prohibition was in 1938, when the
PTO rejected an application for the mark QUEEN MARY (and
design) to be used on underwear.150 The PTO found the mark
scandalous because it associated the name of the Dowager Queen
of England with women’s undergarments.151 Either demonstrating
reluctance on the PTO’s part to reject such marks, or reluctance
on the applicants’ part to appeal rejections, the next decision
involving political images did not occur until 1993. In In re Old
Glory Condom Corp., an applicant attempted to register a mark
consisting of OLD GLORY CONDOM CORP. with the design
element of a condom decorated with American flag-like stars and
stripes for use on prophylactics.152 The PTO initially refused to
register the mark because it connected the “sacrosanct” symbol of
the flag with condoms and sexual activity.153 Upon appeal, the
application was approved, in large part, because the applicant
stated on its condom packages that having safer sex and
eliminating AIDS is a patriotic act.154 The PTO expressed great
reluctance to quash this form of political speech even if some
Americans may have considered it improper.155
While political images were the first category of material
prohibited under the scandalous registration, the current
approach of protecting political speech makes it highly unlikely
that subsequent trademark applications would be prohibited as
scandalous or immoral simply due to political imagery. This shift
may reflect a changing social norm regarding the appropriateness
of critiquing political images. Further, objections to certain recent
trademark registration applications, such as AL QAEDA, do not
156
rebut this shift.
The PTO has made clear that such marks are
rejected due to their association with terrorism, and thus illegality,

See Ex parte Martha Maid Mfg. Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156 (Comm’r Pat. 1938).
Id.
152 In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1216-20.
155 Id.
156 AL-QAEDA, U.S. Trademark Serial No. 78/444,968 (filed July 1, 2004), Office
Action from William Breckenfeld, Trademark Attorney, to Jon Messner (Nov. 22, 2004)
(rejecting the application because “al qaeda” refers to an organization that undertakes the
bombing of civilians and other terrorist acts that are shocking to the sense of decency); see
also OBAMA BIN LADEN, U.S. Trademark Serial No. 77/086,418 (filed January 19,
2007), Office Action from Karen K. Bush, Trademark Attorney, to Alexandre Battle (Feb.
6, 2007) (initially refusing registration because, among other things, it references a
terrorist and because it associates a United States presidential candidate with that
terrorist); BABY AL-QAEDA, U.S. Trademark Serial No. 78/400,213 (filed April 12, 2004),
Office Action from William Breckenfeld, Trademark Attorney, to John A. Race (Feb. 23,
2005).
150
151
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rather than any political speech.
Notably, it took decades to effectuate the changing social
norms into trademark policy regarding registrability. More
importantly, this aspect of the scandalousness standard moved
from being more restrictive to more permissive, giving ample
notice to trademark owners regarding the kind of marks that will
be excluded as scandalous due to political content.
2. Religious Terms and Icons
As the pre-1905 common law suggested, the PTO also applied
scandalous registration prohibition to protect religions. While it
would be logical to evaluate these terms for “immorality,” the
decisions discuss the matter in terms of scandalousness. Unlike
the common law discussion of immoral businesses, these decisions
involve situations where the mark itself contains religiously
significant terms, names, or images.
In 1938, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals considered
whether the mark MADONNA is scandalous when used in
connection with wine.158 The majority, finding the application
scandalous, associated MADONNA with the Virgin Mary in
Christianity, which “stands as the highest example of the purity of
womanhood, and the entire Christian world pays homage to her as
such.”159 In contrast, it described intoxicating liquors as causing
various “evils,” as indicated by national prohibition, state
regulation and prohibition, and a Supreme Court decision
decrying the evils of alcohol.160 While conceding that the mark
MADONNA is not per se scandalous or immoral, the court noted
and quickly dismissed any positive Biblical references to the
consumption of wine and the connection between wine and the
Virgin Mary.161
One may attribute the caustic Riverbank Canning Co. majority
opinion to its apparent support of prohibition, which had been
repealed in 1933 by the Twenty-first Amendment to the United
States Constitution.162 Moreover, one might assume that, due to
changing social norms, a similar mark for alcoholic goods would
Id.
In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938). As the dissent
noted, the mark MADONNA and pictorial representations of the Virgin Mary had already
been registered numerous times in connection with various goods, including tooth
powder, cold cream, and food. Id. at 329-30. In fact, the applicant had previously
registered two forms of the MADONNA mark for various food items. See U.S. Trademark
No. 186,786 (filed Jan. 30, 1924); U.S. Trademark No. 342,537 (filed Aug. 14, 1936).
159 Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d at 329. The court relied upon little evidence to
support its conclusions regarding the public’s perception of Virgin Mary. See id. at 328-29.
160 Id. at 329 (citing Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304, 307 (1917)).
161 Id.
162 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
157
158
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not automatically be refused registration decades later on the
same grounds. Yet, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB), the appellate forum for PTO decisions, applied the same
reasoning in 1959 to another application for the use of
MADONNA in connection with wine,163 and again in 1968 to find
the mark MESSIAS, equivalent to the term Messiah, scandalous
when associated with wine and brandy.164 Rather than undertake
any assessment of changing social norms, the TTAB simply relied
upon its prior decision. As with the political imagery category, the
decisions indicate that the PTO tends to be slow in adjusting for
social norms. Once the PTO has classified a particular word or
phrase as scandalous, it seems likely to continue excluding the
word or phrase as scandalous for far longer than may be strictly
necessary under society’s standards.
The In re Riverbank Canning Co. decision appears to be driven
by the idea that religious terms and images should be refused
trademark status when paired with an “inappropriate” good as
determined by the relevant religion. Several subsequent decisions
applied the same standard. Thus, when a trademark applicant
attempted to register SENUSSI for cigarettes, the TTAB refused
registration because of the specific religious tenets associated with
the “Senussi,” a Muslim sect which forbids smoking cigarettes.165
On the other hand, the TTAB allowed registration for the mark
AMISH (with picture) for cigars and cigar boxes because Amish
religious principles do not forbid cigars and tobacco.166
Taking this approach one step further, the PTO has
considered whether a religious term has a secular meaning that
the public would be more likely to associate with the mark than
the religious term. For example, the TTAB allowed registration
for MOONIES (with a buttocks design) in connection with a doll
that apparently drops its pants (“mooning” the audience).167 The
decision focused on the mark’s design elements and associated
good as emphasizing the non-religious meaning of the term. The
TTAB also recognized that the term “Moonies” appears to be an
accepted, rather than derogatory, term for members of The
Unification Church.168
The only exception to this trend occurred in 1943, when the

See In re P.J. Valckenberg, GmbH, 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
See In re Sociedade Agricola E. Comerical Dos Vinhos Messias, S.A.R.L., 159 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 275, 275-76 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
165 In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.m.b.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339 (T.T.A.B.
1959) (noting that use of the mark would disparage the Muslim sect).
166 In re Waughtel, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 594, 594-95 (T.T.A.B. 1963).
167 In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1653-54 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
168 Id. at 1654 n.4.
163
164
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PTO refused registration for the mark AGNUS DEI (and picture)
used for metallic tabernacle safes.169 Regardless of the religious
character of the associated goods and the fact that Catholic clergy
were apparently not offended, the PTO found it offensive to
“commercialize an emblem of such highly sacred religious
significance.”170 This per se position against the commercialization
of religious terms and images is similar to the position Browne
took in his pre-1905 treatise. Yet, perhaps because the general
public cannot possibly know the religious terms and beliefs of
every religion, most decisions now only consider whether the
relevant religion prohibits the associated goods or whether those
who practice the relevant religion would be offended.
3. Race, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
Marks evaluated for scandalousness due to their connection
to race, gender, and sexual orientation are evaluated in a similar
manner to marks associated with religious terms and images.171 Of
race, gender, and sexual orientation, the most prominently
discussed category is race, due to the Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.
cancellation action. In Harjo, a group of Native Americans sought
to cancel all registrations containing the term “redskins” owned by
the Washington Redskins football team as scandalous, disparaging,
or bringing the relevant group “into contempt or disrepute.”172
The TTAB ultimately found that, even though the term “redskins”
was a derogatory term, the marks were not scandalous to a
substantial composite of the general population.173
When
169 See Ex parte Summit Brass & Bronze Works, Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 22 (Comm’r Pat.
1943).
170 Id. at 23. Agnus Dei translates to Lamb of God and is significant in Catholic masses.
As Browne suggested, the PTO held in the alternative that the mark was incapable of
trademark significance—it could not serve as an adequate source-identifier. Id.
171 While there have been no appellate decisions regarding sexual orientation, it
certainly seems that certain marks have had difficulty registering because they refer to
sexual orientation. See, e.g., DYKES ON BIKES, U.S. Trademark Serial No. 78/281,746
(filed July 31, 2003); Office Action from Sharon A. Meier, Trademark Attorney, to Brooke
Oliver (Feb. 20, 2004) (DYKES ON BIKES initially refused for registration on the basis of
disparagement, was eventually allowed for publication and is currently involved in an
opposition); FAG, U.S. Trademark Serial No. 78/164,481 (filed Sept. 16, 2002), Office
Action from Nora Buchanan Will, Trademark Attorney, to Peter P. Michaud (initially
refused registration as scandalous and derogatory and eventually abandoned).
Although similar objections could (and should) be raised based upon gender, the
objection is not always raised. Compare SHOE WHORE, U.S. Trademark Reg. No.
2,959,584 (filed Jan. 9, 2004) (no objection) and BIKER BITCH, U.S. Trademark Reg. No.
2,828,348 (filed Mar. 4, 2002) (no objection), with DE PUTA MADRE, U.S. Trademark
Serial No. 78/827,324 (filed Mar. 2, 2006) (“The direct translation [of DE PUTA
MADRE,] ‘WHORE MOTHER’S’ . . . also comprises derogatory, scandalous matter.”
Letter from Nelson B. Snyder III, Trademark Examining Attorney, to Howard N.
Aronson).
172 Pro-Football, Inc., v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (D.D.C. 2003).
173 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1748-49 (T.T.A.B. 1999),
rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
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evaluating disparagement, the TTAB appropriately applied a
narrower standard than that of scandalous; the relevant standard
is the perceptions of the (purportedly) disparaged group rather
than those of the general public.174
It seems unlikely that a mark would be perceived as
scandalous by the general public but fail to be perceived as
disparaging or derogatory by a substantial composite of the
targeted group. Moreover, because these terms are the kind that
may take the general public more time to be recognized as
offensive, inclusion of these marks within the scandalous standard
has simply served to obfuscate the appropriate standard and
consistency in evaluating scandalous marks. Both these marks and
those containing religious terms and images have a limited
reference group and thus should more properly be evaluated
under the disparagement portion of 15 U.S.C. § 2(a) rather than
under the scandalous registration prohibition.
4. Sexual Matter (Vulgar)
One of the more significant categories of marks evaluated
under the scandalous registration prohibition includes marks that
are connected to sexual material. The decisions discussing these
marks are, however, some of the most inconsistent and
unpredictable. The first reported decision occurred in 1952 when
Parfum L’Orle applied to register the mark LIBIDO for perfumes
and toilet water.175
The Examiner originally rejected the
application because the word “libido” refers to sexual desire, but
the Commissioner summarily reversed the Examiner, declaring
the mark unlikely to be shocking.176
The next decision was in 1971, when the TTAB refused
registration for BUBBY TRAP as scandalous based upon two
essential facts: the mark was applied to brassieres, and “bubby” was
defined as a vulgar term for breast.177 Without significant analysis,
discussion, or identification of the relevant segment of the
population, the TTAB held that the mark would be offensive to a
segment of the population.178
A mere two years later, however, the TTAB allowed
registration of a much more explicit mark, WEEK-END SEX for a

174 See id. at 1738-39; see also In re Squaw Valley Dev. Co., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1264
(T.T.A.B. 2006); see generally In re Mothers and Fathers Italian Ass’n, 2000 TTAB LEXIS 52
(Feb. 11, 2000); In re Undeas, Inc., 2000 TTAB LEXIS 39 (Jan. 28, 2000).
175 See Ex parte Parfum L’Orle, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (P.T.O. 1952).
176 Id.
177 In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 443-44 (T.T.A.B. 1971).
178 Id.
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magazine.179 The TTAB subsequently also allowed registration of a
drawing consisting of a sad, naked male apparently staring at his
genitalia to be used for a corrective implement to increase human
penis size.180 The TTAB not only considered the mark appropriate
in light of the goods and contemporary social norms but also
seemed to be swayed by the fact that the mark was a drawing
rather than a photograph.181 The use of a drawing may explain
the entirely different result in In re McGinley, concerning a
photograph of a nude man and woman kissing and embracing for
a sex-oriented newsletter and swinger-related services.182 It would
appear that the mark in McGinley was nothing more than an
extension of the marks considered in the prior two decisions and,
thus, should have been allowed to be registered. To the contrary,
the TTAB rejected the application.183 Based upon the rather
limited factual analysis, one can only conclude that the
photograph was rejected because the majority believed that it
exposed part of the male genitalia, a risk that is less likely with a
drawing.184
In the more recent era, the TTAB has allowed registration of
marks that have both vulgar and non-vulgar meanings. Thus, the
TTAB allowed registration of BIG PECKER BRAND for clothing
even though one of the numerous definitions for “pecker” is penis
(vulgar); the TTAB’s decision was influenced by a dictionary
notation that the vulgar definition was becoming archaic.185 Not
only did the TTAB find the primary meaning of “pecker” to be an
innocuous one related to birds, but the TTAB also relied upon the
specimens in the trademark application as reinforcing the
innocuous definition by using the mark with a bird image.186
Likewise, the Federal Circuit expressed great skepticism that the
term BLACK TAIL, used for an adult entertainment magazine
featuring African-American women, would be considered
scandalous because of its non-vulgar definition.187 The most
In re Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334, 334-35 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
In re Thomas Labs., Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50, 50-52 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
Id. at 52.
In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 482 (C.C.P.A. 1981). As the applicant noted,
numerous works of art, such as Michangelo’s David, are far more explicit than the
proposed mark. See id. at 483.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 487 (Rich, J., dissenting) (finding that the application should not be barred
because the male genitalia are not exposed).
185 In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1471 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
186 Id. at 1472.
187 In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1368-69, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994). After
the Federal Circuit remanded the matter for greater factual development, the PTO
allowed the mark to publish. Subsequently, two individuals raised an opposition, which
eventually focused upon disparagement rather than scandalousness. Boswell v. Mavety
Media Group Ltd., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600, 1602, 1604 (T.T.A.B. 1999). The TTAB
179
180
181
182
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extreme example of this trend, however, is the TTAB’s decision
related to the mark TWATTY in connection with a cartoon strip.188
Although the term “twat” is accorded only one vulgar meaning,
the TTAB relied on comparatively weak evidence to find that the
term “twatty” not only looks different from “twat” but also has a
non-vulgar meaning.189 Because the TTAB was uncertain whether
the term “twatty” would be accorded a non-vulgar meaning, the
TTAB allowed registration.190
In stark contrast, other marks have been refused registration
because the TTAB accords the term only one meaning, or only
one generally known meaning, and that meaning is vulgar. The
Federal Circuit affirmed the registration refusal for 1-800-JACKOFF and JACK-OFF in connection with adult entertainment
services.191 The term “jack off” is accorded only vulgar meanings,
which was reinforced by applicant’s use of the word to relate to
masturbation.192 Thus, the court found it appropriate to refuse
registration. Likewise, even though some scientists or other
subsets of the population may have recognized a non-vulgar
meaning, the TTAB refused registration of THE BEARDED CLAM
for restaurant services because the general population would only
be acquainted with the vulgar meaning.193 In addition to the
inconsistency between these two cases and, for example, the
TWATTY matter, these last two cases also demonstrate an
inconsistency as to whether the PTO will use a per se standard or
will examine extrinsic considerations. Despite espousing doubt
that there is a non-vulgar meaning, the Federal Circuit evaluated
the JACK OFF marks in the context of the associated services and
advertisements to find that the applicant was directing the public
to the vulgar meaning.194 In contrast to the TWATTY matter, the
TTAB brushed off evidence that clams do have a feature called a
beard and determined the matter solely upon the mark, THE
BEARDED CLAM, without considering whether the services would
direct the general public to the non-vulgar understanding.195
5. Profanity (Vulgar)
A slightly different category of vulgar terms are those that are
allowed the mark to be registered. Id. at 1605-09.
188 In re Watkins, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 66 (Feb. 8, 2005).
189 Id. at *1-2, *10-12.
190 Id. at *12.
191 In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
192 Id.
193 In re Douglas, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 524, at *10-13 (Sept. 7, 2004) (finding that the
general public would likely only know the vulgar definition).
194 Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1339.
195 Douglas, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 524, at *10-14.
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considered profane. As with marks relating to sexual matter, these
decisions are inconsistent.
The first relevant decision evaluated whether BADASS was
registrable for stringed musical instruments; the PTO Examiner
used a dictionary to define “bad” and “ass” and refused the mark
The TTAB reversed, relying upon the
for registration.196
applicant’s alternate explanation that the term was an acronym
and the fact that the unitary mark was not a profane term and only
a limited portion of the population would recognize “badass” as
including the profanity “ass.”197 In doing so, the TTAB appeared
to apply a presumption that, if there is an alternate explanation to
justify the profane word, the mark will not be rejected as
scandalous. Thus, the TTAB allowed registration of FRIGGIN’ in
connection with refrigerator magnets because the PTO failed to
establish that a substantial composite of the purchasing public
would regard the mark as scandalous; in so holding, the PTO
recognized that the innocent, alternate explanation was a
“stretch,” and most definitions accorded a vulgar connotation to
the term.198
In other decisions, however, marks containing profanity have
been assessed on more of a per se standard, meaning that the
refusal is not influenced by any factors extrinsic to the mark itself.
For example, when considering an application for BULLSHIT for
personal accessories, the TTAB rejected the applicant’s argument
that the mark satirized the use of designers’ names on the outside
of accessories and that the term “bullshit” has a non-profane
meaning in contemporary dictionaries.199 Using the substantial
composite of the general public standard, the TTAB refused
registration because it determined that the mark would give
offense to the composite’s conscious or moral feelings.200 The
TTAB also refused registration of REALLY GOOD SHIT in
connection with oil for automotive, marine, industrial, residential,
and sporting use solely because the term “shit” is vulgar.201
As with other vulgar marks, one cannot find consistency in
the approach to profane marks as the examining body has

In re Leo Quan Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370, 371 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
Id.
In re Friggin Barnyard, 1999 TTAB LEXIS 108, at *8-16 (Mar. 30, 1999).
In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 864, 866 (T.T.A.B. 1981); see also In
re Red Bull, GmbH, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1375, 1381 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (noting that a per se
standard was applied in the Tinseltown decision).
200 Tinseltown, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 865; see also Red Bull, GmbH 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1382
(finding that the mark BULLSHIT is still scandalous).
201 In re R.G.S. Group, Ltd., 1997 TTAB LEXIS 293, at *1 (Mar. 5, 1997). The TTAB
also refused registration for various marks containing the term SCHITTHED for beer. In
re Frankel, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 250 (Mar. 29, 2002).
196
197
198
199
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occasionally used a contextual approach. Thus, the TTAB looked
to the context of the mark and associated goods to determine that
“asshole” in THE COMPLETE A**HOLE’S GUIDE TO . . . clearly
referred to the vulgar definition of a person rather than the
potentially non-vulgar definition of an anatomical part.202
Applications containing images involving profanity have
received equally inconsistent treatment. Thus, for example, the
TTAB had little difficulty in refusing an application consisting of a
dog defecating and feces as a mark to use on clothing.203 On the
other hand, the TTAB allowed registration, in a split decision, for
BAD BEER FROG, with a design described as a frog “giving the
finger,” a vulgar gesture usually understood to mean “fuck you.”204
The majority based its decision upon uncertainty that the frog was
raising a middle finger (given that it only has four fingers) and the
fact that “giving the finger” may not be scandalous.205 The dissent
was understandably incredulous at the majority’s reasoning,
particularly given the numerous news articles identifying this
specific mark as a frog giving people an obscene gesture.206
Regardless, the mark was issued a registration.
6. Illegality
It is consistent with the pre-1905 common law and legal
scholars to find scandalous any mark that expressly refers to illegal
activity.207 While there is a paucity of reported, relevant decisions,
there are two cases involving terms or images associated with
marijuana, and in both, the marks were approved for registration.
In In re Hepperle, the PTO Examiner initially refused an
application for ACAPULCO GOLD for suntan oil because the
term “Acapulco Gold” was commonly understood to mean
marijuana.208 Upon appeal, the TTAB considered the term in light
of the associated goods and determined that the average suntan
oil purchaser would associate the term with the resort city of

In re Zaharoni, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 3, at *1, *8 (Jan. 4, 2005).
Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635, 1638-39 (T.T.A.B.
1988). Likewise, the TTAB quickly rejected any innocuous interpretations of the mark
DICK HEAD’S for restaurant services when it was paired with an image of male genitalia
fashioned to resemble a head. In re Wilcher Corp. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929, 1933-34
(T.T.A.B. 1996). Apparently, the applicant commonly combined the mark with the
phrase “GIVE ME HEAD . . . TILL I’M DEAD,” which reinforced the scandalous
interpretation. Id. at 1932-33.
204 In re Bad Frog Brewery, Inc., 1999 TTAB LEXIS 86, at *1-2, *20-21 (Mar. 16, 1999).
205 Id. at *3-6, *8 (arguing that the finger may be meaningless unless it is directed at a
particular person and that the gesture may be socially acceptable).
206 Id. at *9-29.
207 See supra Part II.B.
208 In re Hepperle, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 512 (T.T.A.B. 1972).
202
203
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Acapulco, Mexico rather than an illegal substance.209 In Schlage
Lock v. Staiano, the TTAB considered a design mark consisting of
the term KRYPTOKING beneath an image of a plant with three
leaves for various clothing, accessories, and smoking related
items.210 The TTAB rejected the argument that the mark should
be prohibited as scandalous, noting that the depicted leaves may
be aloe leaves rather than marijuana leaves, the associated goods
in the trademark application are legal, and the word “toking” was
not prominent in the word KRYPTOKING.211
On the other hand, the TTAB refused registration for W.B.
WIFE BEATER for clothing.212 Even when defined as a style of
shirt, the TTAB found that the term clearly evokes connotations of
spousal abuse.213 Thus, the mark was refused registration as
scandalous.
B. Current Standard for Scandalous Marks
Over the last 100 years, various standards have been applied
to terms classified as scandalous marks—from a per se scandalous
standard to one evaluating whether a targeted segment of the
population would consider the mark scandalous and eventually to
a standard evaluating whether a substantial composite of the
general public would consider the mark scandalous in light of its
context. Part of the difficulty in finding a single standard is that
there are really two different categories of marks at issue: marks
where the negative implication is addressed to a specific subset of
the population and marks where the question is whether the
general population would react negatively. Marks falling in the
first category include those relating to religious organizations,
gender or racial groups, and sexual orientation. The concern
raised by these marks is the negative effect the terms have upon
the targeted group. Thus, it is more appropriate to consider these
marks under section 2(a)’s disparagement standard.214
For those marks considered under the scandalous registration
prohibition, the question still remains as what the standard should
be. At least in name, the majority of recent decisions have
adopted the Federal Circuit’s articulation in In re Boulevard
Entertainment:
209 Id. Although the mark survived the scandalousness objection, it was still refused
registration as likely to cause confusion with a preexisting registration of ACAPULCO for
makeup. Id.
210 Schlage Lock Co. v. Staiano, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 543, at *1 (Dec. 12, 2005).
211 Id. at *24-25.
212 In re Love Bottling Co., 2005 TTAB LEXIS 261 (June 22, 2005).
213 Id. at *20-21.
214 See supra Parts III.A.2-3.
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[T]he PTO must consider the mark in the context of the
marketplace as applied to the goods described in the
application for registration. In addition, whether the mark
consists of or comprises scandalous matter must be determined
from the standpoint of a substantial composite of the general
public (although not necessarily a majority), and in the context
of contemporary attitudes, keeping in mind changes in social
mores and sensitivities.215

This has been applied as a two-step test where the examining body
must first determine the likely meaning of the mark and then
evaluate if a substantial composite of the general public finds the
mark scandalous.216
Regardless of whether the examining body purported to
apply this standard or any other, the examining bodies over the
past century have moved back and forth between applying a per se
approach and applying a contextual approach.
This
schizophrenic movement likely reflects courts’ dissatisfaction or
subconscious rejection of attempts to force all scandalous marks
into the traditional trademark mold, namely, one where
trademarks are accorded rights (or given meaning) only in the
context of the associated goods or services.
C. Justifications for Enacting a Scandalous Registration Prohibition
Given the inconsistent manner in which examining bodies
have evaluated scandalousness, one may attempt to harmonize the
decisions by resorting to the underlying purpose for which
Congress enacted the registration prohibition. Interestingly, at
least one contemporary of the 1905 Act considered the
prohibition’s justification to be “obvious,” but then failed to
further articulate this “obvious” reason.217
Subsequent
commentators and the courts have postulated two potential
justifications for enacting the scandalous registration: avoiding the
appearance of government imprimatur and protecting
government resources. Neither sufficiently explains this particular
exception to trademark registration rights.
One justification for barring registration of scandalous and
immoral matter is to avoid giving an “implied approval” of the
mark.218 This concern likely arose from the perception that
215 See, e.g., Schlage Lock, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 543, at *22-23 (quoting In re Boulevard
Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
216 LALONDE, supra note 13, § 3.04[6][a][i][A].
217 TRADE MARKS = TRADE NAMES: FOR THE BUSINESS MAN 25 (1912) (“For obvious
reasons, scandalous or immoral matter is refused registration.”).
218 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 483 (C.C.P.A. 1981); see also Ritchie v. Simpson, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1859, 1861-62 (T.T.A.B. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 170 F.3d 1092
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[J]ust as the issuance of a registration does not indicate any
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trademark registration is evidence that the mark is proper and
lawful, leading the public to perceive government approval of any
Despite the purported
mark with a federal registration.219
concerns of creating a government imprimatur, by 1993, this
justification fell somewhat from favor.220 The TTAB noted:
Just as the issuance of a trademark registration by this Office
does not amount to a government endorsement of the quality
of the goods to which the mark is applied, the act of
registration is not a government imprimatur or
pronouncement that the mark is a “good” one in an aesthetic,
or any analogous, sense.221

This shift likely reflects recognition of an increasingly
sophisticated general public.
To a certain degree, however, the fear of government
imprimatur is rooted in the registration system. Allowing a mark
to register indicates that the government either did not find the
mark to be scandalous in its evaluation or had such doubt as to the
scandalous nature that it waited to see if anyone in the general
public would contest the registration.222 Thus, in some sense, the
PTO does give the public the impression that the government
reviewed the registered mark and found it unlikely to be
scandalous or immoral.
However, if the scandalous registration prohibition is to avoid
government imprimatur, then it would seem that the PTO has
been a poor caretaker of that task. As with all other prohibitions,
when the PTO is in doubt, it allows the mark to proceed to
publication with the notion that, if someone found the mark to be
offensive, that person would raise an objection or bring a
cancellation action.223 If the true justification for prohibiting
scandalous marks was the fear of giving government imprimatur,
then it would be more appropriate to apply the reverse
presumption, prohibiting the PTO’s registration of any mark that
may have scandalous or immoral matter, even if the PTO is
doubtful about that conclusion.
As an alternative justification, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals postulated that the scandalous registration
prohibition reflects “a judgment by the Congress that such marks
endorsement of the goods on which the mark is used, it also does not imply the
government’s pronouncement that the mark is a good one, from an aesthetic or any other
viewpoint.”).
219 See RICHARDS & WHITE, supra note 50, at 92.
220 See, e.g., In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1220 n.3
(T.T.A.B. 1993).
221 Id.
222 In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1654-55 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
223 Id.
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not occupy the time, services, and use of funds of the federal
government.”224 In other words, government resources should not
be “wasted” in protecting scandalous material,225 a justification that
is still rooted in judging the value, or lack thereof, of scandalous
marks. However, a registration prohibition that is uncertain in
scope and application does not avoid “wasting” government
resources.
To the contrary, one may speculate that the
government spends more resources debating with the applicant
(or third parties) whether a mark is scandalous than it would if it
allowed the mark to register.226
The obvious justification for prohibiting registration of
scandalous marks is to regulate morality and, specifically, to guide
potential trademark owners away from “improper” trademarks.227
In 1909, for example, the Commissioner of Patents indicated that
the role of the Patent Office included discouraging the use of
marks that detract from “the dignity of the high office which
[Presidents] have held.”228 The intent behind the prohibition of
scandalous marks may have been to chill adoption and use of
commercial speech that would offend portions of the general
public.229 Despite this “obvious” justification, at least one court has
rejected the implication that section 2(a) reflects a congressional
attempt to regulate morality.230
Perhaps the problem with intuiting the justification for the
scandalous registration prohibition is that the prohibition, as
currently applied, is entirely disconnected from the underlying
purpose for which trademarks are protected. Trademarks were
originally granted protection as a consumer protection
mechanism with the additional benefit of encouraging producers
to associate their marks with good quality.231 It is entirely
consistent with this premise to prevent registration of marks that,
for example, are so similar to other registered marks such that the
general public would be confused as to the appropriate source.232
Likewise, it is consistent to prohibit the registration of a
In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
See id. For example, a federal registration on the Principal Register is prima facie
evidence that the mark is valid for the goods and/or services listed and that the mark is
owned by the registrant. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a) (2006).
226 See, e.g., McGinley, 660 F.2d at 487 (Rich, J., dissenting) (“More ‘public funds’ are
being expended in the prosecution of this appeal than would ever result from the
registration of the mark.”).
227 LALONDE, supra note 13, § [6][a][i][A] (“The Lanham Act indirectly protects the
public morals by barring scandalous and immoral trademarks.”).
228 Ex parte Banner Cigar Mfg. Co., 1909 C.D. 9, 10.
229 See Baird, supra note 5, at 675.
230 McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486.
231 See supra Parts II.A.1-2.
232 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006).
224
225
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recognized national flag or emblem because it could lead the
public to assume that the product is associated with or sponsored
by the nation.233 Assuming that religious terms and images were
incapable of serving as a source-identifier, as was believed in the
1880s, the prohibition of religious terms and icons as immoral
marks would serve the underlying purpose of the Lanham Act.
However, the scandalous registration prohibition as a whole is
entirely unrelated to concerns about consumer confusion,
encouraging better quality products, or any other related
concerns.234 Rather, the prohibition relates to the quality and
public perception of the mark itself and, thus, more aptly
resembles the rationale behind the protection afforded to famous
marks.
IV. A PROPOSED TWO-TIERED APPROACH TO SCANDALOUS MARKS
When twentieth century United States courts considered a
test for scandalous or immoral trademarks, they faced two
substantial restrictions.
First, courts were confined by the
contemporaneous theories of trademark protection, which, until
recently, only afforded a limited property right for the mark in
connection with the associated goods or services. Courts were also
limited by their insistence in creating a single standard to draw a
line between marks that are scandalous and those that are not. As
the Federal Circuit recognized, courts have had great “difficulty in
fashioning a single objective measure like a substantial composite
of the general public from the myriad of subjective viewpoints,
[but] we are duty bound to apply the standard set forth by our
predecessor court.”235 Rather than fighting to create a single, all
encompassing test for the scandalous registration prohibition,
United States courts would be better served to consider a twotiered approach that incorporates modern trademark theory
regarding famous marks because it would lead to more
consistency.
A. The First Tier of Scandalous Marks: Per Se Scandalous Marks
The proposed first tier is only feasible in light of recent
developments in trademark law, namely, recognition that famous
marks should be accorded more of an absolute property right.
See id. § 1052(b).
See, e.g., Baird, supra note 5, at 673-74; see also ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R.
THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS
600 (2003) (noting that the scandalous registration prohibition, unlike other
prohibitions, is unrelated to competitors communicating with the public or avoiding
deception).
235 In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
233
234
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The concept of a nearly absolute property right for famous marks
is generally attributed to a 1927 article by Frank I. Schechter.236
Schechter noted that highly distinctive trademarks may be
“impress[ed] upon the public consciousness.”237 Traditional
trademark protection is insufficient to protect an essential part of
the mark’s value—the public’s ability to instantly identify the
mark’s source simply by reference to the mark.238
When choosing a trademark, companies either create a new
symbol (e.g., the Nike swoosh) or use preexisting words or images
that are either inherently distinctive or acquire distinctiveness
(e.g., APPLE for computers). To constitute famous marks,
however, these marks must move beyond merely being distinctive.
Rather, famous marks are at a higher level where the mark is a
“household name,” and simply noting the mark immediately calls
a particular meaning or image to mind.239 For example, merely
stating “Rolls Royce” calls to mind an image of established, upperclass wealth and is instantaneously associated with one source.
Similarly, the Coca-Cola Company has invested in its COCA-COLA
brand to the point where the general public instantly knows the
product’s source simply by referring to the COCA-COLA mark.240
The general public also associates one image or meaning to the
COKE mark, namely, people who are “‘care-free, sophisticated,
but willing to work to unite the world in ‘peace and harmony’” or,
for DIET COKE, as care-free, fun-loving, young, and happy.241
After recognizing the value of Schechter’s concept, Congress
adopted the Federal Anti-Dilution Act in 1996, which granted
additional protection to “famous” trademarks.242 Thus, the owners
of famous marks are able to raise a dilution claim to prevent other
entities from using the same mark in connection with any other
goods or services.
Famous marks, therefore, are those believed to have such
power that they can serve a source-identifying function or imageidentifying function without reference to the associated goods and
236 See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 825 (1927).
237 Id.
238 Id. at 831.
239 Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2002).
240 Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for “Famous” Trademarks: AntiCompetitive “Monopoly” or Earned “Property” Right?, 47 FLA. L. REV. 653, 662 n.28 (1995)
(discussing subliminal associations).
241 Id. The quoted passage refers to Coca-Cola’s famous advertisement where a multicultural group sings I’d Like to Teach the World to Sing. More recent advertisements for Diet
Coke include young, happy people roller-skating near a beach with the song Starry-Eyed
Surprise playing in the background.
242 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24:67; see also Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 453-54
(4th Cir. 1999).
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services. These marks have only one meaning to the public. If
there are scandalous marks that are able to conjure a singular,
negative meaning or image immediately and without need to
reference the associated goods, these scandalous marks should be
treated as the inverse of a famous mark—in other words, as
absolutely unavailable for registration.
Recognizing the parallel nature between famous marks and
these per se scandalous marks leads to two conclusions. First, these
per se scandalous marks should be determined by using a test that
parallels the test used for famous marks—or at least parallels the
considerations implicit in the test for determining famous marks.
Second, given the apparent policy considerations in prohibiting
scandalous marks, marks should be prohibited as scandalous even
if they have a scandalous meaning only within a region of the
United States, similar to marks identified as famous based upon
public recognition within a niche geographic area. Under this
test, if the term PINK TACO is a vulgar reference that is only
recognized in the Southwestern part of the Untied States, it would
still be prohibited from federal registration under the proposed
approach.
1. Per Se Scandalous Marks Exist
Some marks are classified as scandalous when considered in
light of the associated product, as the In re Riverbank Canning Co.
court found when evaluating the MADONNA mark in association
with liquor.243 The first proposed tier, however, includes only
marks that are scandalous simply by their existence, regardless of
the associated goods or services.
Examining bodies have struggled in applying the current
standard for the scandalous registration prohibition because, at
least in part, they instinctively want to consider certain marks as per
se scandalous. For example, the TTAB in In re R.G.S. Group Ltd.
focused almost exclusively on the meaning attributed to the term
“shit” in the mark REALLY GOOD SHIT and had little patience
with any argument that the mark should be allowed to register.244
Similarly, the TTAB in In re Douglas & Watson rejected THE
BEARDED CLAM mark for restaurant services solely after
considering the vulgar meaning accorded the mark.245 These types
of marks, profane or vulgar, are the ones most commonly
associated with the scandalous registration prohibition. For
example, one general intellectual property supplement gives only
243
244
245

In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
In re R.G.S. Group, Ltd., 1997 TTAB LEXIS 293 (Mar. 5, 1997).
In re Douglas, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 524 (Sept. 7, 2004).
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one example of an immoral mark—a mark resembling a sex
organ.246 Likewise, the supplement’s only example of a scandalous
mark is one showing a mutilated corpse.247 By focusing solely
upon the mark in identifying scandalous or immoral marks, the
author implies that these marks would be prohibited regardless of
the associated good or services. Notably, these proposed marks
also align with the proposal to limit scandalous marks to those that
connote vulgarity or illegality.
The danger in applying a contextual approach to a per se
scandalous mark is exemplified in In re Boulevard Entertainment,
Inc.248 The Federal Circuit considered whether it should classify as
scandalous the marks 1-800-JACK-OFF and JACK-OFF (“JACK OFF
marks”) used for “‘entertainment in the nature of adult-oriented
conversations by telephone.’”249 The main inquiry focused on the
meaning of “jack off.”250 Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defined the
term only as a vulgar phrase that refers to masturbation, but the
court also considered definitions in Forbidden American English,
American Slang, and Historical Dictionary of American Slang.251 Some
of the reference material pointed to an alternate definition of an
incompetent person, jerk, dolt, or idiot and subsequently
identified this alternate definition as vulgar.252 Thus, calling
someone a “jerk” may not be scandalous, but calling someone a
“jack off,” even though it has a similar denotation, has a vulgar
connotation that is recognized by the general public and by the
PTO’s reference material. After examining the mark in its context
with reference to its definition, associated goods or services, and
applicant’s use of the mark, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
PTO’s determination that the mark was scandalous.253
Although the court reached the “right” result, this case
demonstrates the dangers of applying a contextual analysis to per se
scandalous marks. While the applicant fought to register its JACK
OFF marks, the PTO evaluated and allowed registration of the

246 RICHARD STIM, PATENT, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK: AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
DESK REFERENCE 414 (Nolo 8th ed. 2006). Note that the PTO has considered this type of
mark as possibly scandalous rather than immoral. See supra Part III.A.4.
247 See supra Part III.A.4. These examples stand in sharp contrast to the example given
of a deceptive mark—a mark suggesting miracle properties in a product when those
properties cannot be substantiated. Unlike the per se scandalous marks, the PTO must
evaluate not only the mark, but also how the mark compares to the underlying product or
other contextual information before finding it deceptive.
248 In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003). It seems likely that the
term JACK OFF would satisfy the first tier requirements described supra Part IV.A.
249 Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1338 (quoting appellant’s trademark application).
250 Id. at 1339.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 1340.
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mark JACK OFF JILL for a musical group.254 According to the
Federal Circuit, the difference in registration status is justified by
the context—JACK OFF JILL is a double entendre that could
relate to the nursery school rhyme of Jack and Jill.255 Later PTO
decisions for marks containing the “jack off” phrase have a
similarly inconsistent result, which is likely due to the PTO’s
contextualization of the marks.256
Allowing registration ignores the fact that the majority of the
public would still see the admittedly scandalous material.
Moreover, it is indisputable that consumers would have to refer to
the product offered under these marks by using the scandalous
phrase.
Under any of the identified justifications for the
registration prohibition, marks containing JACK OFF should be
prohibited. Moreover, allowing a contextual analysis of these
vulgar phrases merely encourages potential applicants to push the
boundaries by mixing scandalous material with non-scandalous
material in an attempt to obtain a federal registration for a risqué
mark or a mark containing a sexual innuendo. Thus, the
contextual approach encourages, rather than chills, use of marks
containing scandalous material even if the applicants are
ultimately able to obtain only common law protection.
It is significantly easier to avoid inconsistent decisions when
per se scandalous marks are at issue because the relevant context
should be minimized. There is no need to examine the associated
goods or services because the mark’s meaning will not change,
indicating that the marks should be treated as if they were an
absolute and unavailable property right. These per se scandalous
marks, therefore, are like the mirror image of a “famous” mark in
that they fall within their category based purely on public
perception of the mark’s meaning or image. Just as with famous
marks, no new entities are allowed to register the scandalous
marks.257
See U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 2,363,770 (filed July 31, 1998).
Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1343. The Federal Circuit strains to harmonize these
decisions. For example, in the nursery rhyme, Jack fell down the hill first, and Jill came
tumbling after. Given that, why would Jack be on Jill, meaning that the nursery rhyme
justifies the mark JACK OFF JILL?
256 Compare U.S. Trademark Serial No. 78/604,378 (filed April 7, 2005) (issuing an
office action alleging that ONE JACK OFF for gambling services is scandalous) with U.S.
Trademark Serial No. 78/604,405 (filed April 7, 2005) (never raising the scandalous
registration prohibition for ONE JACK OFF (and playing card design) for gambling
services). Even though the mark in the second application had a pictorial context that
leads the general public to associate the mark with gambling, the fact of the matter is that
consumers will have to state the words in order to refer to the services, which should
trigger the same concerns as the word mark application.
257 The parallel between famous marks and per se scandalous marks also indicates that
per se scandalous marks should not be enforceable under the common law, just as a junior
user of a famous mark cannot enforce his or her purported rights to use the famous mark.
254
255
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2. A Proposed Test for Identifying Per Se Scandalous Marks
As with some scandalous marks, fame is achieved by building
in the public’s mind a strong reputation and renown in the mark
such that the mark evokes a single meaning or image.258 An
inquiry into the standard for determining famous marks,
therefore, suggests an appropriate test for determining which
marks fall in the per se category. Under either the previous
dilution statute or the current one, the factors used to identify
famous marks essentially distill to three concerns. These three
concerns should, likewise, be used to craft a test to identify marks
that should be considered per se scandalous.
Prior to the October 2006 amendments, the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act identified eight factors for courts to
consider in determining if a mark is famous, although no one
factor is required or dispositive:
(1) the . . . distinctiveness of the mark;
(2) the duration and extent of the use of the mark . . . ;
(3) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of
the mark;
(4) the geographical extent of the trading area in which
the mark is used;
(5) the channels of trade . . . with which the mark is used;
(6) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading
areas . . . used;
(7) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar
marks by third parties; and
(8) whether the mark [is] registered . . . on the principal
register.259
After the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, the suggested
However, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this article and, in fact, is mere
speculation. As far as the author can determine, no one has raised any objection to
enforcement of a common law trademark on the basis that the mark contains or consists
of immoral or scandalous matter.
258 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 175 (BNA Books 3d ed. 2004).
259 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (2000), amended by Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). Although the main concern spurring congressional
action related to reinstating a likelihood of dilution standard, the Judiciary Committee
also indicated that it intended to deny protection to marks that are famous only in “niche”
markets. H.R. REP. NO. 109-23, at *8 (2005) (statement of the Judiciary Committee). See
also 152 CONG. REC. S1921, S1923 (2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy, an author of the
original Federal Trademark Dilution Act); 151 CONG. REC. H2121, H2122-23 (2005)
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). As discussed infra, several courts have expressed
similar concerns due to the extraordinary protections granted under dilution claims.
Extension of the “niche market” concept to scandalous marks does not implicate the same
concerns because categorization as a scandalous mark does not provide additional
protection; rather, it prevents extension of additional protections under the federal
registration scheme.
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factors for fame were reduced to four with a preamble discussion:
“a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source
of the goods or services of the mark’s owner,” which is determined
by examining . . .
(1) the duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising
and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by
the owner or third parties;
(2) the amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of
goods or services offered under the mark;
(3) the extent of actual recognition of the mark; and
(4) whether the mark was registered under the [1881 Act], or
260
the [1905 Act], or on the Principal Register.

In addition, the Revised Trademark Dilution Act includes specific
factors for dilution by blurring that may be relevant because, as
with marks subject to blurring, a per se scandalous mark has already
acquired a singular meaning that would transfer to the new
261
entity’s use of the mark.
Both the prior eight factor fame standard and the current
four factor fame standard in conjunction with the dilution by
blurring definition represent at least three considerations. The
first consideration entails examining whether the mark is the kind
that can be unique, singular, and distinctive in identifying the
262
product’s source.
A second consideration is the public
263
recognition of the mark’s singular meaning. The third and final
consideration encompasses the efforts undertaken by the mark’s
owner to create public recognition of the mark on a large scale—
264
to create fame.
With some slight modifications, these same
considerations can be used to determine if a mark is per se
scandalous.
Before applying a test to determine scandalousness, a

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv); see also 151 CONG. REC. H2122-23 (2005).
15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(B).
262 The prior version of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act focused on the mark’s
uniqueness in factors 1 and 7. The current statute encompasses a similar concept in the
preamble language identifying that a mark is famous if it is widely recognized as
associated with the mark’s owner.
Moreover, some of this concern is addressed
specifically in the dilution by blurring portion of the current statute. E.g., id.
§ 1125(c)(2)(B)(ii); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 (2005) (Report of Rep. Sensenbrenner
stating that “dilution occurs when unauthorized use of a famous mark reduces the
public’s perception that the mark signifies something unique, singular, or particular.”).
263 Concern regarding the public’s recognition of the mark’s singular meaning was
identified in factor 6 of the prior statute. Likewise, factor 3 of the current statute focuses
on the extent of actual recognition of the mark as does factor 4 of the dilution by blurring
standard. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iv).
264 The efforts of the owner to create fame were discussed in factors 2 through 5, 7, and
8 in the prior dilution statute. These same efforts are identified in factors 1, 2, and 4 of
the current fame standard.
260
261
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necessary preliminary inquiry is identifying the relevant portions
of the mark to evaluate. For some marks, it is the mark as a whole
that should be evaluated, such as WEEK-END SEX. For other
marks, it may be more appropriate to consider less than the whole
mark, such as just the JACK OFF portion of 1-800-JACK-OFF. In
the context of comparing famous marks to the purportedly
diluting marks, several courts have noted that the purportedly
diluting mark must be identical or nearly identical to the famous
mark.265 To do so, they “must be ‘similar enough that a significant
segment of the target group of customers sees the two marks as
essentially the same.’”266 However, courts have not precluded
themselves from dissecting a mark to evaluate whether part of the
purportedly infringing mark is identical or nearly identical to the
famous mark. For example, the Ninth Circuit noted that a jury
could find that ORBITREK and TREK were nearly identical.267
When applied to scandalous marks, the proposed standard
would require the examining body to consider the mark’s
scandalousness when the applicant’s mark either consists of or
contains a word, phrase, or image that could connote vulgarity or
illegality.268 To apply this standard, the examining body would be
required to parse the trademark elements, but the extent of
parsing should be limited to specific portions of the mark that
would be perceived by the general public as individual words or
images with individual meanings. In the context of evaluating
scandalous words, this kind of dissection is commonly
undertaken.269 For example, if the word “badass” were not

See, e.g., Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 806 n.41 (quoting Luigino’s Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir.
1999)).
267 Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that it was appropriate to evaluate whether NISSAN COMPUTERS dilutes NISSAN for
automobiles because use of the famous mark with a generic term will not preclude a
dilution claim); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Nat’l Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847-53 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (evaluating whether HERBROZAC dilutes PROZAC).
268 For famous marks, courts often apply a high standard of proof or a presumption of
exclusion in order to minimize the ability of a mark’s owner from obtaining the
extraordinary benefits of an anti-dilution claim. Regardless of which justification is used
for the scandalous registration prohibition, it is more appropriate to apply the opposite
approach. For the scandalous registration prohibition, Congress’ apparent desire to limit
registration of scandalous marks warrants application of a presumption such that, when in
doubt, the mark should be categorized as scandalous and, thus, be refused registration.
269 For example, when evaluating BIG PECKER BRAND, the TTAB spent a good deal
of time discussing the meaning of the term “pecker.” In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1470, 1470-72 (T.T.A.B. 1988); see supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text; see also supra
notes 201, 204-05 and accompanying text (noting that the TTAB refused registration for
REALLY GOOD SHIT but allowed registration for image of frog that may be “giving the
finger”). It is likely that the TTAB is willing to parse this kind of mark because of its
perception that the general public is likely to undertake such parsing when it sees a
phrase or a fanciful word that is composed of words that have a preexisting meaning.
265
266
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recognized as a unique word, it would be parsed into the
component words that were united to create the mark, namely
“bad” and “ass.” On the other hand, a proposed mark consisting
of BASS would not be parsed into “b” and “ass” because the word
“bass” is one that the general public would recognize as a word
and, thus, would not be likely to parse when seeing the mark.
Similarly, a mark that slyly refers to another term but does not
actually encompass the term, such as the FCUK mark used by
French Connection Limited Co. UK, would be allowed to register
because it is not a recognized word.270 This proposed dissection,
for example, would have led the TTAB to consider whether the
recognized phrase “jack off” in the mark JACK OFF JILL is
scandalous and thus, whether the mark should be allowed to
register.
Once the examining body has identified the appropriate
portion of the mark to consider, it can then apply the first prong
of the proposed test. The first prong examines whether the mark
(or relevant portion of the mark) has the threshold characteristic
of an “infamous” mark, namely, that the mark or portion of the
mark has a singular interpretation regardless of the associated
goods or services. As will be discussed below, the second prong
evaluates the specific meaning of that mark. By determining
whether the mark has a singular meaning, the examining body
can segregate those marks that are likely to be perceived as
scandalous regardless of their context, and should be per se
prohibited from registration, from those marks that can only be
evaluated by examining the context surrounding the use of the
mark. This inquiry is similar to part of the inquiry undertaken to
evaluate famous marks, in which examining bodies ascertain
whether the mark is such a strong mark that it can be famous.271
In part, the fame inquiry involves determining whether the public
has attached a meaning to the purportedly famous mark. In the
context of determining scandalous marks, the essential inquiry
270 Allowing registration for a mark that suggests a scandalous term, but is not the term
itself, is consistent with prior PTO determinations. More importantly, however, it also
reflects the underlying justifications for this new test. See, e.g., FCUK, U.S. Trademark
Reg. No. 2,920,270 (filed Apr. 6, 1998) (for leather goods and clothing). A word without
a preexisting meaning is simply a fanciful mark (or, at most, a suggestive mark rather than
a descriptive one). Consequently, it has no preexisting, scandalous meaning attributed to
it and, thus, fails to create the kind of impression that is analogous to that of a famous
mark.
271 Best Vacuum, Inc., v. Ian Design, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9794, at *7-10 (Jan. 18,
2005); Thane, 305 F.3d at 912. For most courts, the mark can be famous either based
upon inherent distinctiveness, which includes marks that indicate little or no information
about the associated products (e.g., KODAK), or acquired distinctiveness, which occurs
when the mark is provides some information about the product but, over time, the
general public has learned to associate the mark with the source (e.g., STEAK AND
BREW). SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 234, at 573-74, 700.
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would start by evaluating whether the mark or relevant portion of
the mark would immediately call to mind a specific meaning
regardless of its context. For example, in evaluating BIG PECKER
BRAND, the relevant portion of the mark is “pecker.” As a term,
“pecker” has several different definitions and at least one of its
definitions is not vulgar.272 Thus, the BIG PECKER BRAND mark
would not fall within the first tier because context is necessary to
determine which of the preexisting meanings would be associated
by the public with the mark.
There are a number of resources available to determine
whether a term has multiple definitions. Dictionary definitions
are the primary resource, particularly slang or popular culture
dictionaries. As the Federal Circuit has recognized, dictionary
definitions are an excellent source because “dictionary definitions
represent an effort to distill the collective understanding of the
community with respect to language and thus clearly constitute
more than a reflection of the individual views of either the
examining attorney or the dictionary editors.”273 Contrary to the
Federal Circuit’s determination in In re Boulevard Entertainment,
Inc., however, reliance on dictionaries alone is insufficient.274
Dictionaries often do not reflect the swiftly changing perceptions
of society, which has particular importance in evaluating
scandalousness. First, dictionaries may not include terms that
have recently acquired a pejorative, slang meaning. For example,
most dictionaries do not define the term “pink taco.”275
Alternatively, some dictionaries may falsely indicate that a term
has a single meaning when the general public would assign
multiple meanings. For example, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in In re Riverbank Canning Co.276 used dictionary
definitions to determine if the mark MADONNA would be

272 In general, marks within the proposed first tier would only have a single meaning,
and the second inquiry would evaluate whether the meaning is vulgar or related to illegal
activity. The JACK OFF marks demonstrate a narrow but appropriate exception to that
limitation, namely, some marks may have multiple meanings where all of the meanings
are vulgar or scandalous, such as the term “jack off.” In re Boulevard Entm’t, 334 F.3d
1336, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This appears most likely to occur when the term is
ascribed different meanings depending upon whether the term is used in its noun or verb
form. In such instances, while the first inquiry would indicate that the mark should be
evaluated under the second tier, the mark would be returned to per se scandalous status in
the first tier after the examining body determines that all potential meanings are
scandalous.
273 Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1340.
274 Id. Having a singular, innocuous definition does not preclude finding a mark
scandalous in the second tier. However, it would preclude a mark from inclusion in the
first tier.
275 See e.g., RICHARD A. SPEARS, SLANG AMERICAN STYLE: MORE THAN 10,000 WAYS TO
TALK THE TALK (McGraw-Hill 2d ed. 1995).
276 In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
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scandalous when associated with wine. The court found that “in
the United States, and among all English-speaking peoples, the
word ‘Madonna’ is generally understood to refer to the Virgin
Mary or to a pictorial representation of the Virgin Mary,” and
ascribed a singular meaning to the term.277 Current dictionaries
retain the same definition for the term “Madonna,” and
presumably, a current court that only referenced a dictionary
definition would make the same determination even though a
large portion of American society likely would also associate the
term “Madonna” with the popular singer/actress Madonna.278
While associating the term “Madonna” with the famous
singer/actress would not necessarily avoid a scandalous
connotation, it certainly demonstrates the fallacy of relying solely
upon dictionary definitions to evaluate the meaning of a word or
phrase.
One advantage of the modern era is access to the distilled,
collective knowledge via the Internet. Thus, the PTO is better
able to determine if a term has any meaning at all or if the term
has multiple meanings. For example, the term “pink taco” is not
defined in traditional dictionaries.279 On the other hand, the
Urban Dictionary website defines “pink taco” and gives a list of
synonyms.280 Of the eleven definitions listed, ten define the term
as female genitalia; the only alternate definition provided is a
reference to Morton’s Las Vegas restaurant.281 Because these
slang, on-line dictionaries are rapidly updated, they may contain a
more accurate indication of whether a term has acquired a
meaning. Resources such as Wikipedia are also useful for
determining whether an image, such as a raised, middle finger,
has a meaning. By allowing visitors to add or amend pages,
Wikipedia has amassed a fairly comprehensive webpage of
gestures, including the meaning of a raised middle finger.282 In
addition to these slightly more traditional sources, the PTO can
also use a search engine, such as Google or Yahoo, to see whether
a phrase or term is used by the general public in other settings,
277 Id. at 328. Notably, all further references as to the virtue and general understanding
of the Virgin Mary appeared to be drawn by the court with little or no extrinsic support.
278 WEBSTER’S, supra note 1, at 861 (defining Madonna as “the Virgin Mary,” “a picture
or statute representing the Virgin Mary,” and “an Italian title of formal address to a
woman”).
279 Id. at 1094-95.
280 Urban
Dictionary,
Pink
Taco,
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=pink+taco (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
281 Id.
282 Wikipedia, Gesture, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gesture#Middle_finger (last
visited Feb. 27, 2007). The exact search was the following: “middle finger” raised
meaning. Wikipedia is also an excellent source because it represents the knowledge of
visitors, who collaboratively write or edit the entries. See infra note 285.
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such as blogs, personal webpages, or online emails. These types of
casual uses are likely to reflect the most current usage of a term
and are therefore likely to demonstrate if there is a scandalous
meaning.
There are two potential problems with relying upon Internet
resources to determine whether a term has multiple meanings
and, ultimately, whether it has a scandalous meaning. First, the
scope of the Internet is global, which means that terms or images
may have a meaning in a foreign country yet not have a
recognized meaning in the United States. Although foreign terms
are translated into English for purposes of evaluating their level of
distinctiveness and the likelihood of confusion with other
registered marks,283 it is unclear whether the translation
requirements would apply for purposes of applying the scandalous
registration prohibition. Certainly, there are terms and images
that may either have no meaning or a singular and different
meaning in the United States. For example, raising the first two
fingers into a “v” shape with the back of the hand facing the
audience is a rude gesture in England but could be interpreted as
a peace sign in the United States.284 For consistency with the
doctrine of foreign equivalents, however, it is appropriate for the
PTO to evaluate whether a term has a singular, multiple, or any
meaning regardless of the geographic origin of the information.
Second, the flexibility of the Internet, while a boon, also means
that it can be easily manipulated by a few people. For example,
because Wikipedia entries can be edited by anyone, the
information provided may not always be accurate.285 These
concerns, however, are easily addressed during the PTO
examining process. When the PTO examiner determines that the
meaning is scandalous, he will issue an Office Action to the
trademark applicant and attach copies of all the material relied
upon by the examiner in making his or her determination.286 If
any of the information relied upon by the examiner is
questionable, the applicant will have the opportunity to respond
to the specific material as well as to provide material in rebuttal.
Thus, the PTO can take advantage of these resources, and the
applicant will have the opportunity to respond to any questionable

283 PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PRACTITIONER’S TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINATION PROCEDURE §§ 1207.01(b)(vi), 1209.03(g) (4th ed. 2005). For example,
the PTO translated DE PUTA MADRE (to whore’s mother) when determining if it should
register. See supra note 171.
284 Wikipedia, V sign, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V_sign (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
285 Wikipedia, Contributing to Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
Contributing_to_Wikipedia (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
286 See e.g., supra note 171 (application for DE PUTA MADRE).
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data.
Further, by undertaking a slightly more thorough evaluation
of how a word or term is used in popular culture, the PTO is
better able to determine whether a term has multiple meanings
such that the meaning of the applicant’s mark would be context
dependent. In such a case, the second tier of the proposed test is
more appropriate. If the term has a singular meaning, then the
examining body would continue with the first tier. If the term has
no meaning or only has the meaning given by the trademark
applicant through prior use, the PTO’s inquiry into the
scandalous registration is finished unless a third-party raises the
question again.
If the first factor indicates that the mark has a singular
meaning, then the next factor requires an evaluation of the mark’s
meaning to the general public. In the context of fame, this
consideration is used to refuse “famous” status to marks that are
only famous in the line of business where the owner uses the
mark.287 For example, the Ninth Circuit found that the AVERY
and DENNISON marks were only famous within the office supply
market, meaning that the marks’ fame were limited to a particular
sub-group.288 Thus, the issue is whether the general public is
aware of the purportedly famous mark’s meaning and image such
that the mark can serve its source-identifying function (and image
function) in the absence of associated goods.289
In the context of scandalous marks, the proposed second
factor addresses the meaning accorded to the term by the general
public. Thus, this factor examines whether the singular meaning
ascribed to the mark is one that would be considered scandalous
or immoral, using society’s norms and standards. Marks would
satisfy the second prong if the singular definition squarely and
uniquely falls within one of the articulated categories of
scandalous marks, namely, marks that are sexually explicit
(vulgar), marks that contain profane terms (vulgar), and marks
that refer to illegal activity. General dictionaries or other similar
resources already define terms such as “jack off” and images such
as male genitalia as vulgar or improper for the general population.
In addition, the Internet is an essential resource for resolving this

287 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24:92.
The exception is that some courts will
consider a dilution claim for a mark that is famous within its niche if the allegedly diluting
mark will also be used in the same niche. Id.
288 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1999)
289 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24:92. For this factor, many courts subsequently
consider the percentage of the general public that is aware of the specific marks. See, e.g.,
Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 174-75 (3d Cir.
2000). This aspect will be addressed in the third factor.
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inquiry.
As discussed above, there are numerous Internet
resources that can assist in determining the meaning of a term,
which vary from online dictionaries and encyclopedias to blogs,
emails, and other casual fora. The PTO has already begun using
these resources. For example, when evaluating THE BEARDED
CLAM for scandalousness, the TTAB was highly influenced by the
fact that the PTO submitted a seventy-five page Google search
report after searching for the following: “bearded clam” (porn or
pictures or photos or pussy).290
The question remains whether the PTO should apply the
doctrine of foreign equivalents in the scandalous inquiry such that
marks with a scandalous meaning in a foreign country, including
terms like “bugger” or “bullock” in England, should be prohibited
in the United States as well. Browne would argue that any term
that is scandalous in the world should not be used as a
trademark,291 and certainly such a position would be consistent
with the PTO’s current application of the doctrine of foreign
equivalents. As with current application of the doctrine of foreign
equivalents, it would be limited to translations from languages that
might be familiar to American buyers, such as Spanish.292
While application of society’s mores is often the most
subjective and variable aspect of the PTO’s examination, the first
prong of the proposed test should minimize or eliminate the
unpredictability caused by the subjective evaluation in the second
factor. Focusing the first tier on marks or terms with singular
definitions reduces the inconsistency and ambiguity in
determining whether a mark will be barred as scandalous. The
second inquiry becomes more complicated, however, if the mark
is a longer phrase, such as ONLY A BREAST IN THE MOUTH IS
BETTER THAN A LEG IN THE HAND.293 This kind of phrase
does not have a single word or smaller portion of words that are
already attributed a scandalous meaning, as one might find with
JACK OFF JILL. It is only potentially scandalous when taken as a
whole and, therefore, should not fall within the per se scandalous
tier unless the phrase as a whole is a preexisting phrase in
common parlance.
The final consideration should also, in general, be a relatively
facile analysis. In the context of fame, this consideration evaluates

In re Watson, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 524, at *7 (Sept. 7, 2004).
See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 12:41. As previously noted, the applicant will have
the opportunity to respond to the PTO examiner’s objections where appropriate.
293 See Bromberg v. Carmel Self Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176, 177 (T.T.A.B.
1978).
290
291
292

ABDEL-KHALIK.4.12.07.STEPHEN

228

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

5/18/2007 2:45:11 PM

[Vol. 25:173

the efforts undertaken to make the mark truly famous.294 Most
courts require a very high standard of fame across the relevant
population before they will grant to any mark the status of an
absolute property right.295 The legislative history and statutory
language related to the factors for fame indicate that the
geographic fame of the mark should “extend throughout a
substantial portion of the” United States.296 The reason for having
such a high standard is the desire to limit the extraordinary
remedy of dilution protection to a very elite subset of marks.297
The Revised Trademark Dilution Act and its legislative history
reinforce that there should be a very high, national standard for
298
fame.
Unlike fame, however, categorization as a scandalous mark
results in fewer benefits (rather than granting greater rights).
Perhaps reflecting this distinction, the current standard for
scandalous marks requires recognition by a substantial composite
(but not necessarily a majority) of the general public.299
Information gathered to evaluate the first and second prongs
generally should easily satisfy this standard. If a term is ascribed a
singular meaning in a dictionary or other reference source, then
the examining body will rest assured that a majority of the
population (if not everyone aware of the term) has the same
interpretation of the term. Moreover, anyone in the general
population who does not know the term’s meaning is likely to start
her inquiry in the same place—a dictionary—which would
reinforce the singular meaning of the mark. Even the online
Urban Dictionary provides a running tally of visitor votes that
either agree or disagree with the proposed definition, which
demonstrates the population’s acceptance of the reported
meaning.300
If other, less comprehensive resources are used, then the
third prong requires further analysis. The sheer number of
relevant websites may convince an examiner that the general
population would accord a certain meaning to the term.
However, the question becomes what percentage of the
population must recognize a mark’s scandalous meaning before
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24:92.
Id. (the standard for what constitutes fame is a high one).
H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 7 (1995).
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, §§ 24:67.1, 24:92.
E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A); H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 (2005) (Statement of Rep.
Berman noting that “dilution seems more akin to property protection . . . [and thus] any
anti-dilution legislation should be carefully and narrowly crafted . . . to protect only the
most famous trademarks. . . .”).
299 See, e.g., In re Love Bottling Co., 2005 TTAB LEXIS 261, at *21-22 (June 22, 2005).
300 See, e.g., supra note 280 and accompanying text.
294
295
296
297
298
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the mark is prohibited from receiving a national registration?
There is no specific reason why a term must be nationally
recognized to be prohibited under the scandalous registration
prohibition. In fact, the registration prohibition justifications
indicate that the federal government should do all in its power to
avoid registering any marks that may be perceived as scandalous to
any portion of the population. Such vigilance is consistent with
Browne’s position in his 1873 treatise, arguing that owners should
choose marks that avoid offending even smaller groups of
individuals.301
Further, nothing in the statutory language or the limited
legislative history supports the current, national, substantial
composite standard for determining scandalous marks. In fact,
the foundation for the substantial composite standard is
questionable at best. It was first articulated in In re McGinley, in
which the majority claimed that the standard arose out of the In re
Riverbank Canning decision.302 However, as noted by the dissent in
McGinley, the decision in In re Riverbank Canning did not include
any references suggesting a substantial composite standard.303
The foundation for the standard is likely the TTAB’s
argument that the court should adopt a national standard because
“‘[i]t would be impractical to require the examining corps to be
familiar with the community standards in each state or federal
district.’”304 Such claims are disingenuous, however, because they
offer only the stark dichotomy of either a national standard or a
state standard. Moreover, the PTO’s concerns regarding the
difficulty of identifying more localized slang are unfounded, as
this is the kind of inquiry undertaken on a fairly regular basis in
this and other arenas. For example, the current obscenity
standard requires that obscenity be determined by contemporary
community standards rather than national standards.305 Even
under its current standard, the PTO regularly addresses this issue
because it has never required a determination that a mark would
have to be scandalous to everyone from the northern tip of Alaska
to the southern tip of Puerto Rico. Further, the resources
available to the PTO, including Internet searching capabilities and
access to slang dictionaries, give the PTO Examiner a substantial
basis for determining whether a mark would be considered
301 See BROWNE II, supra note 29, at 608-09 (discussing the need to protect emblems of
any religion from desecration, which would presumably include religions that are
practiced by a very small population within the United States).
302 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
303 Id. at 487 (Rich, J., dissenting).
304 Id. at 484 (majority opinion, quoting the Solicitor, Patent and Trademark Office).
305 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973).
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scandalous or immoral within a more limited geographically
region. Even if the PTO improvidently allows a mark through the
examination process, the general public can oppose or cancel the
mark’s registration.306 Thus, the TTAB’s claims of an impossible
burden ring rather hollow.
Moreover, the current substantial composite of the general
public standard is neither a bright-line nor an inclusive standard.
Once again, reference to standards applied to famous marks is
helpful in formulating a clearer standard for scandalousness. In
the context of niche geographic fame, courts have considered
marks to be famous based upon general recognition within a five
state area as well as recognition within two counties of one state.307
These courts required fame within multiple, preexisting
geographic divisions, which creates a clear bright-line rule.
Similarly, if a geographically recognized region of the country
attributes a vulgar or scandalous meaning to a mark or term
within a mark, then such a level of scandalousness satisfies the
proposed first tier of the test.
Some courts have criticized the use of smaller regions for a
dilution claim, noting that fame in a single state or a region within
three states is insufficient.308 However, these critics have specific
concerns that are irrelevant to the scandalous registration
prohibition. Some of the critics point to the dilution legislative
history and statutory language as indicating that Congress
authorized dilution protection for marks having fame only when
their fame has a substantially national reach.309 Thus, after
examining the legislative history, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
idea that dilution extended to niche, geographically famous marks
because the court believed that “Congress intended that” dilution
protect only marks perceived as famous within “a substantial
segment of the United States.”310
Others criticize niche
geographic fame merely as a means for bypassing the purposefully
high standard for fame.311 Another criticism is that niche
15 U.S.C. §§ 1063-1064 (2006).
Gazette Newspapers v. New Paper, 934 F. Supp. 688, 690-91, 697 (D. Md. 1996)
(finding that recognition in a region of several towns was sufficient); WAWA, Inc., v. Haaf,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at *3, *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1996) (finding that recognition in
a region of five states was sufficient).
308 See, e.g., Star Mkts., Ltd., v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1034-35 (D. Haw. 1996);
GreenPoint Fin. Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 405, 413 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (holding that a mark cannot be famous under the federal statue when the mark is
only famous within the tri-state area).
309 H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3, 7 (1995) (“The geographic fame of the mark must
extend throughout a substantial portion of the U.S.”).
310 Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 641 n.7 (7th Cir.
1999).
311 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,
54 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 n.59 (2004) (noting that Congress intended the standard to be high
306
307
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geographic fame gives insufficient notice to companies in other
parts of the United States and undercuts Congress’ goal of
promoting uniformity and consistency in the law of trademarks.312
None of these arguments is applicable to the scandalous
registration prohibition.
In particular, marks classified as
scandalous are given less protection, as opposed to marks classified
as famous, which are given more protection. Moreover, most, if not
all, entities considering a new trademark would have access to the
same resources as the PTO and should take advantage of these
resources to screen potential new trademarks for unavailability.
Thus, potential trademark owners would have notice of localized,
slang terms with scandalous connotations. Concerns about
overextending the rights of trademark holders or providing
improper notice to others are truly inapplicable in the context of
scandalous marks. Instead, the main concern should be creating a
consistent standard that would allow potential trademark owners
to predict if their proposed marks will be refused as scandalous.
Thus, per se scandalous marks would be evaluated based upon
a three part test: (1) evaluate if the mark or a phrase within the
mark has a singular meaning; (2) determine if the singular
meaning is one that would be scandalous or immoral; and (3)
verify that a significant portion of the population within multiple,
preexisting geographic regions ascribes the scandalous or immoral
meaning to the mark or term within the mark.313 Under this threepronged analysis, the PTO should have less variability in making
its determinations for per se scandalous marks. On the other hand,
if the examiner has any doubt, the mark should not be accorded
the status of a per se scandalous mark and, instead, should be
evaluated under the second tier.
Compare this proposed test to the evaluation of the JACK
OFF marks. The Federal Circuit first considered the meaning of
the mark by evaluating dictionary definitions, the entire context of
the mark, including a picture, and the mark in the context of the
marketplace and as applied to the goods or services described in
the registration application.314 After determining the general
meaning, the Federal Circuit considered whether the mark was
scandalous to a substantial composite (not necessarily a majority)
of the general public.315
and courts have expansively interpreted fame by “analyzing [it] in local markets”).
312 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24.92.
313 For purposes of this test and as discussed previously, this first tier would also include
marks that have multiple meanings if all the meanings are vulgar, as may be true with
phrases like “jack off.”
314 In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
315 Id.
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The problem with the Federal Circuit’s test is that there is a
tremendous level of ambiguity and uncertainty inserted into the
inquiry as soon as the court examines the mark’s context, which is
how the court justified allowing registration of JACK OFF JILL for
a musical group but prohibiting registration of JACK-OFF for
adult-oriented conversations by telephone. Such uncertainty is
unnecessary for terms with a singular meaning referencing
vulgarity or illegality, and the proposed test would eliminate the
inconsistency in the PTO’s prior decisions. The Ninth Circuit has
stated that strictly policing the famousness requirement will lead
to predictability in applying dilution claims.316 Likewise, a strict
application of the proposed test for per se scandalous marks will
increase predictability in categorizing marks as scandalous.
B. The Second Tier of Scandalous Marks: Contextual Scandalous Marks
The proposed second tier consists of marks that are
scandalous when considered in context. Most of the marks
recently evaluated for scandalousness in reported decisions likely
would fall within the per se category, such as THE BEARDED
CLAM or JACK OFF. The second tier would contain marks with
terms that have multiple meanings, including at least one
meaning that denotes vulgarity or illegality, such as BIG PECKER
BRAND.
A unique aspect of the second tier proposal is
implementation of a presumption against the applicant. Under
the current standard, examining bodies appear to use the
contextual approach mostly to find that the mark is not
scandalous, which is what happened with the BIG PECKER
BRAND mark, rather than to place the mark into the scandalous
category.317 This is most likely a side-effect of the current burden
of proof standard, which places the burden upon the PTO to
prove that a trademark falls within any of the section 2
prohibitions.318 For example, in In re Friggin Barnyard, the TTAB
reversed a refusal to register FRIGGIN’ for refrigerator magnets,
even though the TTAB conceded that the applicant’s proposed
non-vulgar meaning is strained, because the PTO failed to satisfy
its burden of proof.319
316 Thane Int’l, Inc. v Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2002). Of course,
the Ninth Circuit was concerned with using the factors to exclude marks as failing to meet
the fame standard, and the proposed test uses the same considerations to include marks
within the scandalous registration prohibition.
317 In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470 (T.T.A.B. 1988). But see In re Zaharoni,
2005 TTAB LEXIS 3 (Jan. 4, 2005) (finding that the applicant is using the term ASSHOLE
for its vulgar meaning because the mark referred to the person buying the book).
318 In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
319 In re Friggin Barnyard, 1999 TTAB LEXIS 108, at *8 (Mar. 30, 1999).
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The scandalous registration prohibition should not be subject
to the same standards as the other section 2 prohibitions. Unlike
these other prohibitions, the scandalous registration prohibition is
entirely unrelated to promoting fair competition or avoiding
public deception. Rather, it is grounded in a desire to protect
from offense—either to protect the general public from being
subjected to offensive material or to protect the government from
associating with or wasting resources protecting offensive material.
It is more consistent with the implicit value judgment in all three
justifications to refuse registration for marks that may be
scandalous. Thus, any mark that consists of or comprises a term
with a potentially scandalous connotation should be subject to a
presumption of scandalousness unless the applicant overcomes
the presumption by reference to the context. Moreover, shifting
the burden to the applicant also gives notice to potential
applicants regarding the difficulty in registering marks with the
appearance of scandalousness, which serves to channel potential
applicants away from such material. At the same time, this
channeling function will not quash the speech of trademark
owners. After weighing the costs and benefits of a potential
trademark, potential owners may still choose to use a scandalous
mark with the understanding that the mark cannot receive the
benefits of a federal registration.
Assuming that the applicant chooses to defend its mark, it will
have to demonstrate that the mark, when considered within its
context, will suggest a non-vulgar meaning. To overcome the
presumption of scandalousness, the relevant contextual factors
must be discussed. These factors are all based on material
intrinsic to the application: the remainder of the mark, the listed
goods and services, and the limitations on the mark’s reach.
The first step is to examine the term in the context of the
remainder of the mark. For example, if the term is used in
conjunction with an image, the image may steer the general
audience towards the more innocuous definition, as occurred with
BIG PECKER BRAND. However, the inquiry into the other
elements of the mark should be limited to the mark as described
in the application, rather than relying upon the packaging or
other elements related to the manner in which the applicant has
used or intends to use the mark. Unfortunately, the TTAB has
allowed such material to influence it in the past. For example, the
TTAB allowed the marks in In re Old Glory Condom and In re
Hershey to register and refused registration to the mark in In re
Boulevard Entertainment based upon the manner in which the
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applicant was using the mark in the specimen or packaging.320
Reliance upon such information is faulty at best. The only
relevant inquiry is the public perception of the mark rather than
the current intention of the mark’s owner. Even if the packaging
or submitted specimens add material, the applicant’s use of the
mark will not be so restricted forever; it is subject to the owner’s
whim. The only true limitations upon applicant’s use of the mark
are the restrictions included in the trademark application. Thus,
for example, the owner of BIG PECKER BRAND could easily
change their label to remove the bird image and replace it with a
vulgar image or merely use the word mark without an image.
Given the justifications for the scandalous registration prohibition,
it would be more appropriate to require relevant limitations on
the mark to be a permanent part of the mark rather than simply
relying upon the applicant to always use the mark in the same
manner. Applying such a rule strikes a balance between the
scandalous registration prohibition and allowing marks like BIG
PECKER BRAND to register.
The second contextual factor examines the associated goods
and services identified in the application to evaluate if they tend to
steer the mark towards the vulgar or non-vulgar meaning. For
example, the goods associated with the BUBBY TRAP mark
convinced the PTO and TTAB that the mark should be refused
registration as scandalous because using the word “bubby” in
connection with brassieres suggested the vulgar breast definition
of “bubby” rather than the “little boy” definition.321 However, it is
critical to consider the marks in light of the goods or services
identified in the application, which can sometimes be a larger or
broader category than the good or service actually provided by the
applicant. Thus, for example, when the TTAB considered a
photograph of a nude man and woman embracing for a magazine,
the TTAB properly considered the mark as used on a newsletter or
social club services in the broad sense described in the application
rather than in the narrow swinger’s context for which the
applicant actually used the mark.322 Knowing that the PTO will
carefully examine the described goods and services may channel
applicants towards giving more specific descriptions.

320 In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting the
applicant’s advertisements emphasize the vulgar definition); In re Old Glory Condom
Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (noting the message on the package
regarding using condoms to prevent AIDS); Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470 (noting that the
specimen shows the image of a bird next to BIG PECKER BRAND, which means that the
public may think of the non-vulgar definition of “pecker”).
321 Mavety Media, 33 F.3d at 1372.
322 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 483 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
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Merely examining the full mark and the associated goods will
not always be sufficient to determine how the mark will be
perceived, as demonstrated by BLACK TAIL.323 This leads to the
third, and related, category of relevant information for
determining whether the mark should be registered: trade
channels, channels of distribution, and relevant audience. Under
the current standard, the only audience considered is the general
public. In fact, it is well settled that marks are presumed to be
viewed by all potential audiences in all trade channels appropriate
for the identified goods and services unless there are restrictions
in the application.324 Thus, for most applications, it is appropriate
to consider whether the general public would perceive the mark
to be scandalous.
However, to do so may exclude a layer of legal businesses,
namely, those that the general public considers tawdry or
immoral. Consider Boulevard Entertainment’s applications to
register JACK-OFF in association with entertainment services in
the nature of adult-oriented conversations by telephone. At the
end of its decision, the Federal Circuit addressed Boulevard
Entertainment’s claim that it should be able to receive a federal
registration because sexually oriented publications are enthusiastic
about receiving advertisements featuring the term “jack-off.”325
The Federal Circuit rejected such reasoning because such an
assertion does not inform whether the term would be considered
vulgar to people outside the sexually oriented publications
industry.326 Assuming for the moment that the mark was no longer
universally identified as vulgar and fell in the contextual
scandalous mark tier, Boulevard Entertainment would be able to
obtain a registration if it restricted the services in its application to
certain market channels, equaling limiting enforceability of the
federal registration. Such limitations are often required by the
PTO before a junior user can register a trademark.327 A similar
process of focusing on a specific industry, customer base, or other
manner of delineating a narrow market will allow entrepreneurs
in less savory businesses to obtain a federal registration and all the
attendant benefits, while still protecting the general public from
being faced with scandalous matter in the local supermarket.
323 Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1373-74 (noting that BLACK TAIL could refer to the vulgar
definition or the non-vulgar definition of buttocks).
324 See, e.g., Royal Appliance Mfr. v. Minuteman Int’l, Inc., 30 Fed. Appx. 964, 969 n.1
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
325 Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1342.
326 Id.
327 See, e.g., In re Kanematsu-Gosho (U.S.A.) Inc., 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 849, 850
(T.T.A.B. 1977) (finding that goods presumed to move through all trade channels unless
the applicant included a restriction in the application).
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Thus, the proposed second tier contains a presumption that
material that could be scandalous would be prohibited, but also
includes a mechanism to allow registration of certain marks that
would be contextually scandalous for the general public. In large
part, however, the proposed second tier effectuates the protective
purpose of the scandalous registration prohibition by imposing a
presumption against allowing registration that can only be
overcome if the applicant properly narrowly tailors its mark or its
description of goods and services.
CONCLUSION
Some would be happy to have either fame or infamy,
believing that either is the path to immortality. Certainly, both are
defined by wide-spread public perception.
In the federal
trademark registration system, however, Tieck is right. Only
famous marks obtain the extra privileges and extra “life,” whereas
scandalous, or infamous, marks may as well never have existed.
We may never know exactly why Congress enacted the scandalous
registration prohibition in 1905, but the more recent
congressional bodies have expressed little desire to clarify or
remove the prohibition. One fact is clear from congressional
action over the last century:
the scandalous registration
prohibition will continue to be part of our trademark regime.
Thus, it would better serve trademark applicants, federal
trademark officials, and the general public if there were greater
clarity regarding what is a scandalous mark and how one can avoid
accidentally adopting a mark that can never obtain a federal
registration. A two-tiered evaluation, which adapts to consider
various meanings and various audiences, will better serve these
channeling functions. Consistency breeds certainty, which guides
applicants towards more appropriate marks, avoids accidental
government imprimatur of scandalous marks, and preserves,
rather than wastes, government resources.

